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ABSTRACT 
The unprecedented ubiquity with which technological advancements, such as blockchain, the 
Internet of things (IoT), big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI), are impacting the 
world has forced large organizations to rethink their information technology roadmaps. Their 
decisions about how they invest in technology have become more important. It is against this 
backdrop that companies must decide how much to invest in their aging technologies versus these 
new potentially transformational ones. A decision is only as good as the information available to the 
decision-makers when they make it. This research project seeks to understand the effects that 
information asymmetry has on strategic information technology (IT) investment decisions within 
large complex organizations. The data collected for this study was gathered from six executives. The 
conceptual model was grounded in Akerlof’s (1978) seminal paper on information asymmetry. This 
study followed an Action Design Research (ADR) approach to formulate the problem and an 
elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process model to create a solution. Results indicate that 
using the proposed solution will result in organizations making more informed strategic IT 
investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
In November 2017, Shelley Broader, the CEO of Chico’s FAS, a Fortune 1000 company, 
spoke at a University of South Florida (U.S.F.) breakfast and, in her opening remarks, she 
highlighted a common situation with large corporations—for a shared services operating model, her 
firm had duplicates of a lot of things. In addition, there were several systems of record for the same 
data elements. She further explained that her primary strategic priority was to weed out duplicate 
processes and tools. Specifically, she targeted the elimination of what she referred to as “skunk 
works” that sprung up throughout her firm and typically resulted in the acquisition of IT software 
and hardware that was not centrally approved. The driving motivation for Shelley was cost, and 
without an expense line in her income statement that aligned to revenue projections, she would see 
her firm move toward bankruptcy (Broader, 2017). I believe the issues with Broader’s enterprise 
information systems to be endemic of all large complex organizations, and I propose that the issue 
cannot be resolved until researchers discover and confirm the factors involved and their interactions. 
This research project advances our understanding of how strategic IT investment decisions are 
made. 
Unfortunately, most firms do not address the problem until they are in Broader’s situation, 
with market or competitive forces forcing them to take dramatic action. Once they are forced to act, 
I have seen firms attempt to fix Broader’s problem in many ways. Two of the most common include 
1) purchasing more software and 2) creating additional projects. The software often purchased 
includes tools categorized as IT Asset Management. These tools are targeted at identifying IT 
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hardware, software, and support contracts within an enterprise. In theory, once these assets have 
been identified, a firm is able to understand who, if anyone, is using the assets. Another common 
approach to improving an inefficient and expensive enterprise information system is investing in a 
“data team” and purchasing software for them to discover and manage data critical to enterprise 
performance. While purchasing software is common, firms like Broader’s also create new projects, 
with the expectation of eliminating redundant and unnecessary technology assets, including the 
associated human capital. These projects are typically called “portfolio rationalization” investments, 
where “portfolio” is defined as all the people, processes, and tools that comprise an enterprise 
information system. 
I have seen these investments in discovery cost millions of dollars and wind up with limited 
short-term benefits—while still proclaimed as wins by executives—and then return to business as 
usual with neither a reduction in operating expenses nor materially improved business performance. 
I propose that the primary reason for this behavior is that the problem is very complex and requires 
a transformation of the way enterprise information systems are managed at large complex firms. 
After all, if investment in software and projects is required to simply identify the existence of 
technology assets, it raises the question: “If we don’t know what we have, how do we know how it is 
all engineered to work together?” 
My experience in practice—including 11 years where I played a role in the strategic IT 
investment decision-making process—led me to discover that much of the information required to 
make sound strategic IT investment decisions is not communicated to decision-makers. The IT 
investment decision-making process is elaborate at large complex organizations. It involves long-
range strategic plans, annual budgets, and the participation of many experts from IT, the business 
units, and most functional support areas. A material level of trust is required as a foundation for 
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approving budgets and investing in technology. My experience struggling to discover information 
and to identify owners of the data motivated me to explore this phenomenon. 
Research Goals and Approach 
As highlighted above, it is alarming that organizations need to invest millions of dollars just 
to discover what assets they own and employ. This reveals that there may not be an owner of 
enterprise information system engineering and, if there is, the owner is not maintaining the artifacts 
that are required to perform system design and engineering work. My experience indicates that 
architecture teams lack the artifacts and processes required to manage the overall engineering of an 
enterprise information system. A key requirement for engineering a system is to have state diagrams 
revealing the current and future instantiations. Without these artifacts, strategic and tactical activity 
lacks coherency. This research project sought to discover and confirm the factors that lead to 
information being unavailable to strategic IT investment decision-makers. This study also sought to 
discover the role played by architects in the enterprise information system investment decision-
making process. The need for this role is supported by recent research highlighting the need for 
engineering for the continuous adaptation of the agile enterprise (Hinkelmann et al., 2016). Finally, 
the primary goal of this research project was to offer a solution that reduces information asymmetry 
and improves decision-making. 
An essential element of this research was an understanding of the factors that contribute to 
poor IT investment decisions. To this end, data was collected from six executives over the course of 
two separate studies. The first study sought to discover how business and information technology 
leaders plan and execute changes to information technology. Participants in this first study were 
included due to their unique perspectives, having been leaders within both IT and business. The data 
collected in this first study was coded and analyzed. The first study showed that there are significant 
information asymmetries between IT and business leaders when they make strategic IT investment 
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decisions. This informed the second study, which examined how these information asymmetries 
between business and IT affect IT investment decisions. The first and second studies then informed 
the creation of an artifact that aimed at reducing information asymmetry in the IT investment 
decision-making process. 
The artifact was co-created in practice with a participant from the second exploratory set of 
interviews. In addition to participating in the strategic IT investment decision-making process, he is 
accountable for all relevant investment data communicated to the other decision-makers. The 
objective of this final phase of research was to build an artifact that the participant could validate 
and use to improve his current process. An elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process was 
followed to create the solution. 
Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant concepts. 
Chapter 3 follows with a discussion of the research questions and method. Chapter 4 details the first 
exploratory study and its role in problem formulation. Following Chapter 4, the second study—
discovering evidence of technical debt as a type of information asymmetry—is explained in Chapter 
5. Chapter 6 describes the design, creation and validation of the artifact. A detailed account of 
artifact build is included in Chapter 6. This dissertation concludes with Chapter 7, which summarizes 
the findings, details the contributions, and offers recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
 
 This research is grounded in two concepts—information asymmetry and technical debt. 
Information asymmetry, as detailed in Akerlof’s (1978) seminal paper, describes the behavior of a 
buyer and seller, where the seller has more information about the quality of a car. IT purchases 
within large complex firms have significant information asymmetries between the funding entity (the 
business) and the seller (IT), making the concept of information asymmetry core to understanding 
the IT investment process. Alves et al. (2016) defined 15 types of technical debt. Technical debt 
serves as the context for information asymmetry regarding IT investments. That is, technical debt is 
a class of information that is not equally shared or understood by parties to an IT investment 
decision within large complex organizations. 
Information Asymmetry 
Harris, Kriebe, and Raviv (1982) found that decentralized organizations suffer from the 
effects of information asymmetry between subunits and headquarter functions and that individuals 
with specialized information and expertise also possess information not shared with others. Some of 
the information asymmetry within organizations is self-inflicted. For example, the current research 
project’s preliminary findings included the following experience of a participant when he attempted 
to offer input to IT:  
I continue to be amazed in my current role, where it’s like, “Well you’re not in technology.” I 
understand I’m not in technology, but to totally dismiss all of my prior 13, 14 years of 
technology experience because I’m now in the business is so shortsighted and foolish.  
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While on the surface information asymmetry is a self-evident concept, there are discrete 
behaviors it produces that impact decision-making. When information asymmetry exists between 
entities involved in a decision, two problematic effects may materialize: adverse selection and moral 
hazard. As described by Nayyar (1990), adverse selection occurs when a buyer is unable to observe 
information available to the seller. For example, the seller of a used car has more information than 
the buyer about the quality of the car. Buyers can also have more information than sellers.  For 
example, people purchasing insurance have better information about their health and how they 
expect to behave after they purchase the insurance than sellers. For example, they may begin 
consuming more alcohol or smoking. The adverse selection problem occurs in the context of this 
research when the entity asking for IT investment funding has more information about the potential 
for unfavorable outcomes than the party approving the funding does. In large complex 
organizations, pressure to secure funding for investment is high. Managers compete for limited 
funding and without an IT investment to manage; exceeding annual performance goals is a 
challenge. In addition to differentiating an employee when annual reviews occur, managing large 
projects is a stepping stone to higher levels of responsibility and leadership.  Rarely is a person asked 
to lead strategic investments when she has not successfully led smaller scale investments.  For these 
reasons, gaining approval for IT investment proposals is critical to a person’s career. This situation 
leads to information asymmetry as those selling the investments are incentivized to paint the 
investment in the best possible light. 
Executives charged with approving IT investments make their decisions primarily based on 
information provided during presentations about the investment from the individuals requesting 
funding. They can make an adverse selection if not all relevant information is shared with them. As 
Nayyar (1990) explained, moral hazard involves one party to a transaction taking more risk than the 
other because the other party absorbs the cost of the risk. Moral hazard occurs after an investment 
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decision has been made. At this point, sponsors and managers of the IT investments are expected to 
deliver the promised scope within the budget and timeline agreed to by the approvers of funding. 
When execution does not go as planned, the scope must be trimmed and/or quality must be 
reduced in order to deliver on time. Moral hazard surfaces when sponsors and project managers, 
whose professional success is tied to delivering the promised scope within the agreed timeline and 
budget, are incentivized to withhold information reflecting the true status of the investment. Many 
times, the shortcuts taken, outstanding defects, unused functionalities, etc. don’t surface until the 
sponsor and project manager have moved on to their next roles, and accountability for the situation 
becomes murky, as support personnel absorb the blame for the resulting situation. 
Consider the effects of information asymmetry on any specific project investment 
negotiation. The IT and business staff have very different perspectives and detailed knowledge 
related to a project (or current context). In addition, asymmetries are likely to arise from more 
general differences in educational background, as well as internal and external experience. As 
explained by Eisenhardt (1989), the principal-agent problem (from agency theory) focuses on the 
relationship between two parties, where one party (the principal) delegates work to the other party 
(the agent). This problem applies to the context of this paper as IT personnel (agents) are potentially 
making somewhat self-interested decisions without the business side (principals) being fully 
informed. Information asymmetry can be expressed as adverse selection driven by IT staff based on 
prior knowledge or as moral hazard, as detailed knowledge is accumulated throughout a project. 
System development obviously takes time, so the context here is not really a single decision. 
In Akerlof’s (1978) classic paper on information asymmetry, a thought experiment based on selling 
used cars is presented. Clearly, the seller of a used car has private information about any “lemon” 
being offered to a buyer (Akerlof, 1978). However, this is a one-off decision to purchase or not, 
without any ongoing liability between the parties (except for so-called lemon laws in some 
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jurisdictions). In the context of systems development, there are periodic renegotiations between IT 
and business representatives as the project progresses. The finance literature includes research on 
this topic, including the renegotiations that characterize corporate lending as both borrower and 
lender learn more or face changing conditions (Roberts, 2015). In this study, we have much the 
same situation, with IT staff (borrowers) and business managers (lenders) learning as the project 
progresses and renegotiating as milestones are reached. 
While opportunities to share information relevant to IT investment decisions exist 
throughout a calendar year, this research project highlights some of the reasons information sharing 
does not regularly occur. It is within this context that information asymmetry plays a role in the 
quality of IT investment decisions.  
Technical Debt 
Technical debt is a concept first introduced by Ward Cunningham in 1993. Cunningham 
(1993) defined it as delivering not-quite-right code in order to expedite delivery of software. The 
past 10 years have seen increased academic interest in technical debt. There have been nine 
International Workshops on Managing Technical Debt since 2010, with the latest held in May 2017. 
The workshops culminated in The First International Conference on Technical Debt, held in 
Gothenburg, Sweden, May 27-28, 2018 and collocated with the International Conference on 
Software Engineering (ICSE) 2018. In addition to the workshops and conference, the Journal of 
Systems and Software recently dedicated a special issue to technical debt (Falessi, Kruchten, & 
Avgeriou, 2016). Moreover, a chapter focusing on architectural technical debt—a type of technical 
debt—was written by Li, Liang, and Avgeriou (2014) in the first edition of a recently published book 
entitled Economics-Driven Software Architecture (Mistrík, Bahsoon, Kazman, & Zhang, 2014). While this 
is a relatively nascent discipline, the consistent annual devotion of a core group of academics 
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participating in workshops and publishing literature serves as evidence that the discipline has taken 
root. 
The definition of technical debt has been broadened to include more than the code 
deficiencies that Cunningham (1993) highlighted. Alves et al. (2016) provided a literature mapping, 
which identifies and defines 15 types of technical debt. The types of technical debt include design, 
architecture, documentation, test, code, defect, requirements, infrastructure, people, test automation, 
process, build, service, usability, and versioning debt (Alves et al., 2016). Appendix A lists the 
definitions for each of the 15 types of technical debt. 
While most of the technical debt research has focused on technical constructs, the academic 
community has acknowledged the importance of broadening the lens to include the financial aspects 
of managing technical debt (see Ampatzoglou, Ampatzoglou, Chatzigeorgiou, & Avgeriou, 2015). 
Further support for broadening the research focus of technical debt was agreed upon at the 2016 
Dagstuhl Seminar 16162 workshop on managing technical debt, where one of the findings 
concluded, “there are also other phenomena that are related to technical debt that should be studied, 
such as other types of ‘debt’” (Avgeriou, Kruchten, Ozkaya, & Seaman, 2016). The following 
definition of technical debt was agreed to at the Dagstuhl Seminar 16162: 
In software-intensive systems, technical debt is a collection of design or implementation 
constructs that are expedient in the short term but set up a technical context that can make 
future changes more costly or impossible. Technical debt presents an actual or contingent 
liability whose impact is limited to internal system qualities, primarily maintainability and 
evolvability. (Gemeinschaft, 2016) 
Ampatzoglou et al. (2015) argued that much of the technical debt research uses ambiguous 
terminology and sometimes misuses terms. This confusion adds to the challenge of IT professionals 
adopting the technical debt-related terminology. If research and standards are not clear and 
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meaningful to IT professionals, they are left to their own interpretations of what is important 
regarding technical debt and what should and should not be communicated to their managers, 
finance departments, and business stakeholders. Therefore, finance professionals who are familiar 
with the term are likely very rare. One participant in the preliminary study explained that it requires 
… really getting into the details and looking under the covers with some of these 
calculations. You can really sway a business person’s perspective of what is their opinion, 
because that’s what it comes down to sometimes, what is the opinion of this TCO number 
because it’s subjective. You can input a lot of variables into a specific cost or you could keep 
them out and put them somewhere else. 
What is common are finance professionals or business stakeholders who struggle to understand why 
IT operations and maintenance budgets continue to climb when large capital investments in 
information technology are approved every year in order to not only improve capabilities, but also, 
in many cases, to reduce maintenance expenses. 
While a core group of academics and practitioners have gained traction in defining and 
socializing the technical debt phenomenon, it remains a nascent discipline without a developed 
theory. This hinders the ability for IT professionals to effectively communicate, as the tools and 
methods for capturing technical debt items are only just beginning to gain broad adoption. A 
positive sign is the adoption of standards published in December 2017 by the Object Management 
Group (OMG), in collaboration with the Consortium for IT Software Quality (CISQ) (OMG, 2017).  
Technical debt defines the information landscape and possible asymmetries in specific areas. 
Based on a meta-analysis, Alves et al. (2016) outlined 15 categories of technical debt that can affect 
development projects. The gap between IT and business is exacerbated when there is no shared 
understanding of technical debt. Therefore, efforts to define, standardize, and measure technical 
debt can alleviate the effects of information asymmetry.   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research method employed to answer the 
following two high-level research questions: 
RQ1: How does information asymmetry affect strategic IT investment decisions? 
RQ2: Can we improve IT investment decisions by reducing information asymmetry at the 
point an initial investment decision is made? 
Research Method 
Three phases of research—the first two answering the research questions that inform the 
next phase of research—were executed. The aggregate findings of the three phases of research were 
expected to answer the two high-level research questions posed above. Figure 1 summarizes the 
three phases that comprised the research approach. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this dissertation are each 
dedicated to a single phase (1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
Over the course of my career within and leading business and IT functions, I formed 
entrenched views on the impacts of, root causes of, and potential solutions to the situation. 
Therefore, for the duration of this research project, it was important I compartmentalize, or 
“bracket” (Colaizzi, 1978), my views and suspend judgment in accordance with phenomenological 
research requirements and provide an unbiased reflection of the phenomenon. While Colaizzi (1978) 
recognized that this could never be completely accomplished, I satisfied his requirement by 
continuously questioning if I was shaping the data or if the data were organically surfacing insights. 
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Moreover, I continuously paraphrased what I heard from participants and requested that they 
confirm my understanding of what they said. 
 
Figure 1. Research approach. 
Action Design Research 
 This research project began as an action design research (ADR) effort, with the expectation 
that an artifact would be built, an intervention would occur, and an evaluation would take place 
concurrently (Sein, Henfridsson, Purao, Rossi, & Lindgren, 2011). Sein et al. (2011) qualified 
artifacts as ensembles, i.e., bundles of hardware and software, as defined by Orlikowski and Iacono 
(2001). While this definition is specific in its use of hardware and/or software in defining artifacts, 
there is evidence that the ADR methodology is generalizable to the creation of artifacts that improve 
processes. Specifically, I applied this methodology to the creation of an instrument that improves 
the initial strategic IT investment decision process. Adapting ADR for a broader than originally 
intended application is not a novel idea, and growth of the model continues (Mullarkey & Hevner, 
2018). In fact, Gregor and Hevner (2013) cited Goldkuhl (2002) as the source for defining a process 
as an artificially made object that qualifies as an artifact. Finally, foundational design science research 
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by Hevner et al. (2004) lists part of the constituent community for IS research as “practitioners who 
plan, manage, design, implement, operate, and evaluate information systems” (Von Alan, March, 
Park, & Ram, 2004). This research targets the improvement of process that benefits all roles through 
the reduction of information asymmetry. 
 
Figure 2. ADR method: stages and principles (Sein et al., 2011). 
The rationale for this application of the ADR methodology in this novel way, i.e., to improve 
a process, is that all the required stages and principles comprising ADR, portrayed in Figure 2, can 
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be satisfied when viewing an instrument that improves a process as analogous to a software or 
hardware artifact that solves a problem. As partial evidence, upon completion of phases one and two 
of this research project, stage one of the ADR methodology was complete—a problem had been 
formed and both principles had been satisfied. 
Problem formulation can be triggered by a researcher’s expectation, or it can emanate from 
practice (Sein et al., 2011). Sein et al. (2011) prescribed the steps involved in the problem 
formulation stage. In addition to an initial empirical investigation of the problem, the steps include 
determining the initial scope, deciding the roles and scope for practitioner participation, and 
formulating the initial research questions. I perceived the problem as a practitioner and collected 
data from practice to validate the existence and magnitude of the problem. To this end, practitioners 
that have played a unique dual role of having led IT and business organizations involved in strategic 
IT investment decision-making were identified. 
Semi-structured interviews with the practitioners were employed as the method of data 
collection for the initial exploration of the problem. The first review focused exclusively on 
common words and phrasing. A second review of the data was then conducted with a focus on 
surfacing themes from the interviews. The approach described by Seidman (2013) was followed for 
analyzing thematic connections within and between transcripts. A mind map was generated by hand 
through an iterative process of discovery until the final set of themes surfaced. 
Following the identification of themes, I looked for research that might help explain the type 
of data that emerged. I discovered a relatively recent article published in Information and Software 
Technology, a top tier journal as defined in 2018 by the Muma College of Business at the University of 
South Florida. For the complete list of Information Systems and Decision Sciences (ISDS) journal 
rankings see Appendix B. This article identified a taxonomy of terms that I used to classify the data 
from the second set of interviews. Whereas the initial coding for the first two interviews employed a 
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bottom-up approach, the coding method I used for this second set of data was defined by Auerbach 
and Silverstein (2003) as a top-down, or second cycle, approach, called Elaborative Coding. 
The second set of interviews was conducted with four executives at large complex 
organizations. Large complex organizations are defined as those with annual information technology 
budgets exceeding $500 million. The coding of these interviews is explained in Chapter 5. This 
coding further informed my understanding of the problem and led me to narrow the scope of the 
research project from strategic IT investment decisions to the initial strategic IT investment 
decisions, when the high-level funding is approved—thereby excluding all subsequent phase-gate 
approvals and any change requests requiring additional funding decisions. In addition to narrowing 
the scope, I also refined the research questions and identified information asymmetry as a grounding 
theory for the research. In addition, I discovered that using the taxonomy for the elaborative coding 
had significant explanatory value. The taxonomy used was called technical debt and, while not a 
theory, the concept resonated significantly enough with the participants that it warranted inclusion 
in this research as a grounding concept. Information asymmetry served as the grounding theory, 
thereby satisfying the first principle of problem formulation, as shown in Figure 1 above, and data 
collected from active practitioners satisfied the second principle. 
In addition to the principles for problem formulation, I secured a long-term commitment from a 
participant for the remaining part of the study. Furthermore, I completed the tasks listed in Figure 3, 
which are required by the problem formulation stage, as detailed by Sein et al. (2011). Of the steps I 
have not discussed, step three was accomplished by the abstraction of an artifact. If I solved this 
problem for a discrete decision, it is possible that many more decisions where significant 
information asymmetry within an organization could also be improved by extending this solution. 
Step six was accomplished by clarifying with the remaining participant, who agreed to participate in 
artifact creation and validation. I continued to meet with him to review the results of prior 
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interactions in an iterative fashion. He served as the expert practitioner while I ensured that a 
rigorous process was followed as the next stages of the research project were executed.
 
Figure 3. ADR tasks in the problem formulation stage (Sein et al., 2011). 
Due to the allotted time to complete this dissertation and the context of the problem being 
addressed, a decision was made to use the elaborated action design research (eADR) process model 
for the remainder of this study. The timeframe was months and the nature of the problem being 
addressed included strategic IT investment decisions that are typically made once per year during a 
formal planning process. Evidence reflecting the soundness of a decision is typically not available 
until a year or more after the initial decision, as the duration of strategic investment projects is long. 
This lengthy process required a simulated evaluation of the performance of a designed instrument 
upon which reflection and learning would be captured. This raised the question of how feasible 
ADR is for a process that takes a long time to generate performance metrics, unlike a software 
artifact where evaluation can be executed relatively quickly. Therefore, eADR was viewed as a more 
appropriate method to complete the study, as it allowed for 1) entry into the process at the design 
stage and 2) artifact abstraction as a generalization of the build activity (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018). 
The implementation, evaluation, and learning would have to be simulated for this research project. 
I recognize that eADR could have been employed for the entire research project, and I could 
have retrofitted the initial process to the eADR methodology. I believe it is more important to 
reflect the actual method employed in this research project. Further, this bifurcation within the 
methodology is acceptable, as eADR extends ADR and does not change the core of the problem 
(1 ) Identify and conceptualize the research opportunity 
(2) Formulate initial research questions 
(3) Cast the problem as an instance of a class of problems 
(4) Identify contributing theoretical bases and prior technology advances 
(5) Secure long-term organizational commitment 
(6) Set up roles and responsibilities
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formulation stage. I stumbled on eADR as I iterated several times during the problem formulation 
stage and generated more than one abstraction of an artifact. 
Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) 
 Mullarkey and Hevner (2018) introduced eADR as a process model, which is provided in 
Figure 4. I entered the model at the design phase and used the result of the coding from the 
problem formulation/diagnosis stage of the first study to seed the initial design of the instrument 
with content. I prepared a draft of the instrument to serve as a baseline for initial iteration. Two 
design iterations of the instrument were conducted in praxis and resulted in the co-creation of an 
instrument built by the researcher and practitioner. Each design iteration satisfied the eADR model 
requirements by including activities that resulted in problem formulation/planning, artifact creation, 
artifact evaluation, reflection, and learning. 
 
Figure 4. The ADR process model with research entry points (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018). 
Ethical Considerations 
 While this research project involved human subjects, it was determined that IRB approval 
was not required. The participants are business professionals and their participation was limited to 
their professional experience and expert opinions. The conversations may have occurred organically 
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due to ISO 2015 standards, which require companies to consider and implement opportunities for 
improvement within their organizations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
EVIDENCE FROM DUAL-ROLE EXECUTIVES EXPOSING THE BUSINESS-IT 
DIVIDE 
Introduction 
In 1967, a mere decade after the introduction of the first computer programming languages, 
Russell Ackoff began questioning the value of management information systems, which today we 
call “IT” (Ackoff, 1967). His view on the value of such systems is evident in the title of his paper, 
where he labels them “misinformation systems”. The following half-century has seen global IT 
investment skyrocket to $3.5 trillion annually in 2017 (Lovelock et al., 2018). While advances in 
technology have undoubtedly benefited industry and society, the failure rate for IT projects remains 
between 30-70%, data has never been more at risk, and little academic research exists proving that 
businesses benefit from IT investment. This is not for a lack of trying; the problem is just extremely 
complex. The large amount of investment and abysmal failure rates beg for continued investigation. 
Some researchers have focused on the problem in discrete areas: for example, on the 
geography (Tam, 1998), size (Chaya, 1996), or industry (Ho & Mallick, 2010) of a firm. Others have 
examined the role of the diffusion of technology within firms, alignment of IT investment with 
strategy, and measures of IT value. While these efforts have resulted in advancing discrete strains of 
research, they have been academically isolated. By failing to provide context for the breadth of the 
problem and to advance toward a common objective, the ability to assess the value of IT 
investments has been hamstrung and practice continues to provide suboptimal technology solutions 
for individual firms. 
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The genesis for this exploratory research was to discover insight into the problem at its root, 
at the time when IT investment decisions are made. Rather than continue to approach the problem 
from discrete academic disciplines without a requirement to advance a comprehensive 
understanding with a clear endgame, I look to discover the phenomena that exist at the point of 
making IT investment decisions with the expectation that insights will emerge. I entered this 
examination of IT investment decisions with the supposition that it will lead to advancing our 
knowledge, which may result in benefits for practice. 
This chapter is structured in the following way. First I provide the statement of the research 
question, followed by a description of the research methodology and its appropriateness. I then 
review the study design, method, and data collected. Next, I offer an analysis of the information 
collected followed by a discussion of findings. I conclude by outlining an informed approach for the 
next step of this research project. 
Research Question 
As a first step toward understanding the phenomenon being explored by the two high-level research 
questions for this research study, a process model was created based upon the experience I have in 
creating and implementing the IT investment process at two large complex firms. I modeled the life 
of a typical IT investment in Figure 5 to isolate the context of the problem and facilitate engagement 
with practitioners. 
 
Figure 5. Lifecycle of an IT investment. 
In addition to formulating the problem, the goal of this initial research was to answer the following 
explanatory research question: 
Passage of Time
Information System Change is Implemented
Portfolio Rationalization
(Two dimensions: Perpetual Activities and Targeted 
at Specific Change)
Information System Change Created/Developed
AND
Technical Debt is Incurred
Longitudinal Process of Business Change
(Two dimensions: Perpetual and Directly Traceable 
to Specific IS Change)
Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of a 
Firm's Value
Information Technology System Priorities Declared Change to Business Value
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RQ: How do business and information technology managers and directors plan and execute 
changes to information technology and systems that do not result in optimal returns, as 
measured by value of a firm? 
Research Method 
My professional experience and dialogue with colleagues over the last 20 years led me to 
believe that managers and directors of business and information technology teams are often placed 
in the awkward position of deciding to support local functionality or business performance at the 
expense of misaligning with optimal enterprise-level information system design and performance. 
There is an abundance of published literature targeted at explaining aspects of this phenomenon 
within the IT Business Value body of knowledge. For comprehensive reviews of the literature 
through 2004, see Bakos and Kemerer (1992), Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996), Kauffman and Weill 
(1989), and Melville, Kraemer, and Gurbaxani (2004). 
Most of the research published in the last 20 years has focused on providing a framework for 
assessing the value of factors relevant to information technology impacting business value: for 
example, technical debt and IT-Business alignment, where Google Scholar searches yield dozens of 
published articles. Another concentration of research is focused on offering frameworks intended to 
better execute some aspect of the IT-Business Value equation. While the problem of scientifically 
explaining and controlling IT investment in a way that results in optimized behavior within firms is 
researched annually in a material way, a gap in the research exists. The gap is the dearth of research 
leveraging the practical experience of mid-level business and information technology managers who 
influence technology investments and are tasked with executing the investments. These front-line 
leaders shape the value story at its source, where information system change occurs. Their direct 
responsibility for implementing change gives them unique insight into the difficult challenge of 
 22 
 
connecting specific investments in IT to changes in the value of a firm. This study seeks to tell their 
story. 
As mentioned in the research method section of this paper, ADR was chosen as the research 
method. The first step in the methodology requires formulation of a problem. The process of 
forming the problem requires that two principles are adhered to: the research must be practice-
inspired and it must be theory-ingrained (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2015). By engaging practice in this 
exploratory research, the first of the two principles was satisfied. The second principle was realized 
in the next study, as the theory was identified. 
Finally, in addition to maintaining an objective view of the data, as described in the research 
method of this paper, it was important to limit the scope of this exploratory effort to two 
participants, due to the limited timeframe available to complete this phase of the research and the 
challenge in finding participants who satisfy the unique criteria for participation. 
Data Collection 
To maximize insight into the problem statement, participants were sought that have led at 
the Manager or Director level in both IT and business. Having leadership experience in both fields 
yields unique insight, compared to those who have led in only IT or business. For this research, I 
define business as any function that does not report to the CIO of an organization. As this study 
was limited to weeks, not months, a relatively small number of participants—two—from different 
organizations were targeted for interviews. In addition, the participants were required to be current 
manager- or director-level employees that have had direct decision-making authority to buy or build 
information technology solutions for their respective organizations that materially contributed to the 
enterprise information system of the firm. Materiality for this research was defined as having 
responsibility for at least $1,000,000 in annual IT spending in at least one of the years between 2013 
and 2017. While subjective, the figure $1,000,000 was chosen because the phenomenon being 
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examined is only interesting when organizations grow to a scale where complexity becomes a 
material concern. When firms are small, silos are uncommon, and strategy is naturally easier to 
communicate. Small budgets and simple organizational structures are void of the complexity driving 
the phenomenon addressed in this research. The management of significant financial investment 
ensures that communication of business value is expected when IT investment is sought. It is 
assumed that material investments require communication with the owner of the investment 
throughout the IT investment lifecycle, as seen in Figure 5 above. 
Figure 5 is the conceptual model that framed this data collection activity and was shared with 
the participants prior to the interviews. The interviews were planned for 45 minutes. They were 
expected to end either on time or sooner, if requested by the interviewee. The interviews were 
conducted in person at a location of the participant’s choosing. Access to the participants was the 
result of personal and professional relationships I have with each of them. They both reported 
directly to me at some point in their careers when each was a Director. It has been at least five years 
since the participants reported to me.  
A guiding set of interview questions was prepared and is listed in Appendix C. The list was 
not intended to generate specific answers, but rather to guide discussion in the event the model was 
not enough to adequately generate dialogue. This approach is called semi-structured interviewing 
and allows for the interview to be guided by questions, although the questions may not be asked in 
exactly the same way they are written and only a subset of questions may be asked of all participants 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Once completed, the interviews were transcribed by hand and reviewed 
twice for coding and analysis. The first coding review focused exclusively on common words and 
phrasing. Once each interview transcript was reviewed for word and phrasing commonality, a 
second coding step was employed, which focused on surfacing themes within the interviews. The 
 24 
 
approach described by Seidman (2013) was followed for analyzing thematic connections within and 
between the transcripts.  
Once themes were identified, a hard copy of each transcript was highlighted identifying 
every relevant experience related to one of the themes. The highlighted sections were numbered 
with numbers placed on the mind map next to the appropriate theme and subgroupings under the 
surfaced themes. One page of the mind map is included in Appendix D for reference.1 Table 1 
includes the variables and theme subgroupings that emerged from the coding and mind mapping. 
An example of the specific mapping of transcript passages to themes and subgroups is listed in 
Appendix D. It is important to note that at this stage of the research activity that “IT investment 
decisions” had a broad meaning. The context included all investment-related decisions. 
Table 1  
Mapping participant comments to variables influencing IT investment decisions 
 
                                                          
1 The only missing theme from the mind map is Communication. It did not all fit on the page, so Communication 
was listed on a separate page.  
Variable Sub-grouping Participant 1 (P1)** Participant 2 (P2)**
Communication Frequency 37
Collaboration & Trust 5, 18 28, 43, 44
Negotiation 14
Clear Understanding 16, 18, 19 14, 30, 41, 42
Siloed 1, 7, 11, 18 20, 33, 35
External Stakeholders Customers 14 1, 2, 7, 21, 31
Vendors & Partners 3, 7
Organizational Dynamics* Skill & Domain Competency 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 19 4, 8, 9, 16, 25, 27
Leadership Maturity 24, 26, 40
Location of People 41
Architectural Influence N/A 8 15, 17, 18, 31. 32
Business Strategy N/A 11, 14, 15 23
Motivation (IT Managers) Measures of Work 8, 10, 19 38
Day-to-Day 19, 22
Governance & Valuation Financial 9, 10, 14 5, 10
Intangible Value 10 6, 21
Requirements 16 29
Other 8, 12, 13, 17, 19 12, 13, 34, 35, 36, 39
*Other dependencies in the table, while also organizational dynamics, are broken out due to the materiality of the comments
**Numbers listed under each Participant identify lines of coding from each transcript (See Appendix E for an example)
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Model Validation 
Overall validation of the model was shared by both participants, with Participant 2 (P2) 
explaining, “the model is relevant both to my last position, and obviously, my current position.” The 
model is very high-level and appeared to be self-evident to both participants. The discussion with 
each participant predominantly centered on attributes of the model reflected as themes and 
subgroups provided in Table 1. These attributes reflect dynamics operating within the model. The 
fact that the discussion focused on more detailed attributes leads me to believe that the model will 
have to be enhanced if it is to serve a practical purpose in advancing understanding, changing 
behavior, and improving performance in practice and academia. 
Analysis 
The following analysis covers several themes that emerged during discussion with the 
participants. The themes (listed in Table 1 above) include a mapping of participant comments. The 
model in Figure 5 above seemed to be self-evident to both participants, and many of the 
participants’ experiences validated and provided exemplars of the model. In addition to validating 
several constructs of the model, their experiences raised the importance of weighting dimensions of 
the model, as some influences reflected in the model have relatively more impact on the process 
than others. Some aspects of the model were not affirmed, which are discussed below. Finally, the 
coding and thematic analysis identified several new dimensions that should be included in the model, 
which are also discussed below. 
Regarding the identification of frequently used words, the participants used different words 
to describe experiences. Thus, individual words did not lead to any insight or connection between 
the experiences of the two participants. For example, one participant used the word “language” to 
refer to the importance of understanding a business or technical domain. The other participant also 
described the importance of understanding how other domains communicated and the importance 
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of domain knowledge, but he did not use the word language. As Table 1 reveals, the participants 
surfaced many common themes. These themes, while communicated in different words, are the 
focus of the analysis and discussion. The themes and sub-themes are listed as variables and 
subgroups, respectively, in Appendix E. 
In the sections below, I describe the relationship between lived experiences and high-level 
constructs of the model in Figure 5. This approach is intended to best communicate the insights and 
experiences shared by the participants. 
Communication 
Communication was discussed more than any other theme. Dependence on communication 
was mentioned in the context of frequency, collaboration and trust, negotiation, silos, and clarity. 
Regarding frequency, P2 explained,  
… when tech gets into trouble it is because they are given a big capital budget, the business 
then kind of steps away. Technology then runs with it and they build this stuff and at the 
end of the year they say, “Aren’t you so happy?” and the business sponsor goes “Not really, 
this isn’t what I wanted.” (P2) 
While P2 spoke passionately throughout the interview, when relaying this experience, he had a 
heightened sense of passion and his frustration was palpable. 
Collaboration and trust go hand-in-hand; without trust, the collaboration is challenged. P1 
referred to the importance of trust several times. He explained its importance as follows, 
You get to a certain level where I think the manager or the business professional can’t have 
that knowledge, they’re just too broad of a focus area, so they rely on trust to really know 
whether something is being handled or not and I think that’s one of the things that been 
successful for me is that I’ve been able to instill trust in those above me when I get in the 
technology situations. (P1) 
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While P1 views trust from his manager as positive, he later highlights the negative impact of a lack 
of trust. He explained that IT team members, “are used to kind of the business not really being able 
to talk the language, so they try and keep me at an arm’s length, so it’s difficult for me to really get 
the intel on what’s truly happening” with his projects. P2 was blunter as he explained his experience, 
highlighting the lack of trust and its impact on collaboration. 
And what’s amazing is the individuals like myself, like yourself, who have been in both areas, 
are I find at times the villains in this story, right. The technology people don’t want them in 
the conversation. I continue to be amazed in my current role, where it’s like, “Well you’re 
not in technology.” I understand I’m not in technology, but to totally dismiss all of my prior 
13, 14 years of technology experience because I’m now in the business is so short sighted 
and foolish. (P2) 
Collaboration and trust are required throughout, as highlighted in Figure 1 above. The participants 
highlighted the importance of both to portfolio prioritization and development activities.  
P1 shared the value of negotiation in the communication process, stressing that his voice 
ensures there is “balance” and the needs of the business are balanced with IT priorities, so his firm 
does not, “forget again about the opportunity cost of losing out on a customer” because IT won the 
negotiation and priorities shifted. This negotiation is critical to success in the portfolio management 
construct of the model, but also to the day-to-day building of technology, as daily priorities come to 
drive value. 
One of the most common sub-themes shared by the participants is the importance of clarity 
as it relates to vision, requirements, and success metrics. As P1 explained, clarity is important 
because the details hold the “gotchas or some of the pitfalls” that can really get a project in trouble. 
And sponsors feel they are “obviously clear enough to get the funding” so “we’re good to go, but 
that’s just not the case because there are so many details” that can lead to problems and need to be 
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clarified. Clarity is critical to the model as it plays a central role in appreciating technical debt, its 
cost, and the debt’s eventual impact to business value.  
Silos are the final dependence upon which IT decisions are impacted. Research has proven 
that having fewer silos improves decision-making. One of the products native to a large complex 
organization is silos. Both participants shared experiences regarding silos. P1 summed it up very 
well: 
… it tends to be very siloed from a business architect perspective, you get caught up in your 
own world, maybe not meaning to but the focus is the problem at hand and not always the 
bigger picture and if you’re not proactively communicating with others from a broader 
picture perspective, or if you’re not being told from above to communicate at that broader 
level, it gets overlooked, and we run across that challenge a lot; siloed thinking. (P1) 
Siloed structure and behavior put up invisible walls that stifle discovery and problem solving. Silos 
impact every aspect of the model as they can cause problems with the portfolio management 
process, technical development of solutions, absorption of change within a business, and 
measurement of business value. Limited understanding resulting from artificial walls reduces 
performance. They also contribute to information asymmetry as information has a harder time 
breaking through the invisible behavioral walls of a silo. 
External Customer Influence 
One of the participants currently leads a product team at a software company. He shared the 
relative influence customers have when you are in the business of selling them technology. The 
dynamics are much different when software and hardware aren’t being sold. As P2 explained, 
decisions to take on technical debt are a primary result of the influence customers have on internal 
technology decisions. He shared,  
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… there are tradeoffs made every day to your point, for the client needs A, B, and C by this 
date and well, we have to organizationally build that six months after said date, but if you 
don’t build it by that point, you aren’t going to get the contract. So, we make tradeoffs every 
single day because we don’t want to walk away from a multi-million-dollar opportunity. So, 
technology has to bear the brunt of doing it now and having to undo it six months later or 
redo it or patch it up later. (P2) 
In addition to clients, P2 explained that external partners influence internal technology 
decisions. He shared the following explanation: 
When you think about big platforms and big data, we are not doing it ourselves, we are 
working with industry partners, which has its own challenges, they go belly up, they get 
bought, they do something different, they change their pricing model and you’ve relied upon 
a particular pricing structure as an OEM2 reseller, if they sell their pricing or structure, it’s 
going to have material impact on how you turn around and price the product you are selling 
to customers. And we have lived that my entire two-and-a-half years where if you are heavily 
reliant upon a piece of technology, think about technical debt. If you are relying upon a 
particular technology to power your platform, those vendors might say, “wait a minute,” I 
can change the pricing structure and you kind of don’t have much of a choice if you built 
your platform totally coupled with me. And that’s for the technologist to think through the 
implications three years down the road when this contract renews, will we be in a position 
where if we don’t like the pricing or parameters working with a partner, we can say ‘no’ and 
walk away and quickly transition tech without impacting services you’ve committed to with 
your broader book of clients … that’s challenging. (P2) 
                                                          
2 OEM is an acronym commonly understood by IT professionals that means original equipment manufacturer. These 
companies produce the original parts used to build a product as opposed to those only built for use as replacements.  
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The challenges of incorporating external stakeholder considerations compound already complex 
internal dynamics. This complexity impacts the model throughout, from rationalizing the portfolio, 
to making development decisions and absorbing technical debt, to ensuring the organization 
understands the changes to internal business and effectively adapts, to finally communicating how 
external influences impacted the quantitative and qualitative value of the firm when income 
attribution is computed. 
Organizational Dynamics 
Skill and domain competency were the most referenced dependences. These two variables 
play a critical role in every IT decision. From the line worker to the C-suite, technical knowledge and 
domain competency dominate decision-making dynamics. Regarding domain knowledge and 
technical competency, P1’s experience formed his belief that, “if I am a business architect and I can’t 
speak in terms of the technologists that I’m working with and vice versa, then we are going to have 
challenges right off the bat.” He later elaborated,  
… when it comes to technology projects if you can’t communicate effectively, just like you 
said, it’s the person that can sell the dream will get the funding, well if you can’t 
communicate after the dream is sold, you need someone to translate that to the technologists 
so that’s just not a given that that will happen and I think that’s where a lot of firms get into 
trouble, they just think that’s a given. (P1) 
P2’s experience reinforced P1’s view as he shared,  
In the retail business, it was amazing to me that nobody actually understood the hand raise 
to cash. A customer says I want to sign up and buy from you. Nobody understood how that 
hand raised or tracked that that hand raised actually resulted in money in the bank 60 days 
later. It was incredible to me that you couldn’t find a single soul in the biz that understood 
that process. (P2) 
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In addition to skill and domain competency, P2 discussed leadership maturity. He referenced 
an experience where he perceived a lack of leadership maturity and the CEO reacted, stepped into a 
project, and “bl[ew] up that whole orchestration.” He continued to explain that, “it takes some really 
confident mature individuals to step back and assess.” His assessment of the problem is that he 
thinks, 
… there are a lot of individuals who say, “this isn’t what I signed up for in my career,” it’s a 
lot easier to come in every day, do what I do, go home, manage some people, feel good, I 
don’t want to fire anybody because that’s a lot harder to deal with. (P2)  
Finally, P2 stressed the importance of collocating people when they are working on projects. 
This he viewed as creating “a level of teaming and trust and frankly, the first thing to get others to 
work together—who may report to other people—toward a common objective.” 
Organizational dynamics play out throughout the model. This research exposes deep and 
varied skills: competencies and personalities are compounding factors that make the already 
extremely complex problem of making good technical decisions every day even harder. 
Architectural Influence 
While P1 shared that he had not experienced the influence of architectural standards in his 
current business role, he did share a challenge related to architectural influence. He mentioned that, 
“a lot of technical debt is wrapped up in aging technology” and “sometimes you have to make sure it 
fits with aging technology and sometimes it’s a very big challenge”. He continued to explain that it 
comes down to competing for budget. I perceive this to be strongly related to a lack of architectural 
standards and a roadmap, although this is not corroborated by empirical evidence. P2 was extremely 
candid in sharing his view of technology architects as he finds,  
… most information architects have never actually lived or walked a day in the shoes of 
anybody that has to make money so they are able to kind of sit back on the sidelines and 
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wait for people to make decisions and then jump in like the armchair quarterback and say 
“that was a really stupid decision, why did you do it that way?” (P2) 
He expressed wonder about why architects were not involved at the beginning of projects, implying 
that they are not offered an opportunity to weigh in early. He saw that their “lack of ability to give 
us guidance on what to do is potentially impacting our ability to make money and if the cycle 
continues, I won’t be here, you won’t be here, none of us will be here.” Both participants viewed 
architectural influence as suffering from the “ivory tower” syndrome. The lack of strong 
architectural guidance and success metrics influences the model in several ways, from implementing 
suboptimal designs to failing to guide qualitative assessments of value when technology changes are 
implemented. 
Business Strategy 
Both participants recognized business strategy as playing a key role in setting priorities. P1 
shared a very positive experience with his firm highlighting, “strategic imperatives that haven’t 
changed for us on the business side for at least three years, maybe four years, and they are very 
solid.” He elaborated, 
I mean, they are very basic and we’ve tried to hold true to those from a business perspective 
and stay committed to that, so that’s been very helpful to orient my team around that 
because sometimes it takes a little bit of time to orient a team, get their goals set up, get them 
engaged in the right efforts, make sure they are touching the right projects and when those 
longer term or those bigger imperatives stay consistent, it makes my job much easier from a 
priority standpoint. (P1) 
His experience with business strategy and the value he had derived from having clear and 
consistent goals is in stark contrast to the impact IT strategy and goals have had on performance. 
While the business strategy has been consistent and allowed him time to align to it, IT has moved 
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aggressively and, “the big picture push right now is trying to move everything off of on-prem3 into 
the Cloud”. He explained,  
I think some of that is a little bit short-sighted in that we haven’t even taken into account 
some of our client’s wishes or even run things by them when there is potentially a risk of 
losing business as a result of some of these technology decisions. (P1)  
He stressed that, “there is a dialogue that needs to happen there that some pure technologists miss 
out on from a TCO perspective.” He bluntly summarized that some IT decisions have, “zero to do 
with” business goals. 
P2 clarified the importance of strategy being followed by all levels of the organization. He 
explained the impact when it is not, by clarifying, “these are the objectives, this the priority, this is 
the order we are doing them in and if you have a process where the CEO can jump in and interject, 
it blows up that whole orchestration.” While this certainly speaks to the communication variable, it 
also highlights how important it is to get people marching in a specific direction and arriving before 
changing destination. While this experience highlights the importance of business strategy to 
maintaining focus once a strategy begins to be executed, strategy is most important during the up-
front and continuing portfolio rationalization process. 
IT Manager Motivation 
Motivation was a theme that subtly surfaced through the coding process. References were 
made to IT manager attitudes and, underlying the tension that existed between the participants and 
their IT counterparts, I sensed there was different motivation. For example, in response to a 
question asking how IT managers make objective decisions that may negatively impact their scope 
                                                          
3 “on-prem” or “ on-premises” is common IT jargon for software running on a company’s internal servers versus 
being hosted in the cloud 
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of responsibility or headcount, P2 explained it is important for a firm to have visibility into 
performance, so decisions become less emotional. He said,  
I think the first part of it is tracking and managing the work. So, if you don’t have some 
mechanism to track, manage, and report out the work, then all this is irrelevant, right? 
Because if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it, etc. (P2) 
While this doesn’t provide a great deal of insight, it may be a primary contributor to P1’s dilemma 
when IT priorities are misaligned with his business priorities—IT is motivated differently. P1 
explained, “a lot of that technical debt is wrapped up in aging technology.” IT managers are more 
motivated to upgrade aging technology than they are to support development of new applications 
and functionality. In fairness, according to P1, “there is just no easy answer” to addressing 
competing priorities and motivational dynamics. While this research did not garner enough evidence 
to convince me that IT manager motivation is a strong influencer within the model, it was 
convincing enough to include it as a variable, with the caveat that more exploration of this potential 
phenomenon is required. 
Governance and Valuation 
The final variable identified through the coding process is governance and valuation. There 
were several aspects of governance and valuation that were discussed by the participants. The three 
with the most shared experience are financial, requirements management, and intangible value. The 
general state of affairs is that neither participant has seen governance effectively drive good IT 
investment decisions from initial portfolio rationalization through value harvesting. While neither of 
them has experienced effective governance and valuation, they both recognize how challenging and 
important they are. 
Specifically, P1 highlighted the importance of understanding total cost of ownership when 
making technology investment decisions. He explained that it requires  
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… really getting into the details and looking under the covers with some of these 
calculations. You can really sway a business person’s perspective of what is their opinion, 
because that’s what it comes down to sometimes, what is the opinion of this TCO number 
because it’s subjective. You can input a lot of variables into a specific cost or you could keep 
them out and put them somewhere else. (P1) 
He elaborated by explaining IT managers do not include “the opportunity cost of losing out on a 
customer or having someone walk out the door because they are not happy.” P2’s experience 
reinforced the point that financial governance is important because different roles will choose what 
to include in the cost equation. In P2’s experience, even though everyone signs up for some 
investments, as soon as people are asked to offer hard dollar savings or benefits, “every single sales 
person pushes away from the table” and refuses to commit to incremental revenue. As is the case 
with business strategy, governance and valuation are areas where there is a great deal of published 
research. Unfortunately, it has not led to solving the business problem for praxis. Pulling together all 
of the multidisciplinary research into a single model may force rationalization of all the work and an 
assessment of its potential to solve business’s problem of making suboptimal IT investment 
decisions. 
Discussion 
Through the interviews I was able to not only discover the variables, but I also moved to a 
detailed understanding of the variables. This understanding led me to appreciate just how much 
information asymmetry exists within organizations, as it relates to IT investment. In addition, we 
discovered that technical debt is a type of information that constitutes much of the asymmetry. 
While there is currently a lot of attention paid to and published literature focused on technical debt, 
it is almost exclusively focused on software technical debt. This exploratory research led us to 
believe that the definition of technical debt should be broadened. Technical debt should include the 
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suboptimal performance that is a product of the variables identified in this research not being 
maximized as a whole when an assessment of IT value is made for individual technology 
investments. 
While both participants validated the model, it became clear early in both interviews and in 
analyzing the coding of the transcripts that the model needs to be more detailed for it to effectively 
drive research. There are many contributing constructs that need to be in included in the model in 
order for it to adequately drive alignment and encourage engagement. As a start, the themes and 
sub-groups listed in Table 5 above should be layered into the model. 
In summary, the insights derived from the conduct of this research led to several 
advancements in understanding. The first was the validation of and a specific path for improving the 
model. Each construct of the model has significant depth in its complex definition, an abundance of 
existing research, and unending, yet unexplored, experiences in practice. For the model to be 
meaningfully communicated and eventually serve as a tool for assessing the business value of IT 
investments, a supporting artifact is required to answer questions regarding how each piece of the 
model reflects more nuanced aspects. For example, the experiences of both participants highlight 
the need for consistent collaboration throughout the life of information technology investments. 
While this would seem to be straightforward, in practice, a lack of collaboration and trust is very 
common and has material negative impacts on firms. An artifact is required to clarify this influence 
and frame how researchers and practitioners engage to better understand and improve performance. 
Another example of required refinement is clarifying why Organizational Dynamics is broader than 
Human Resource Dynamics. 
Another advancement in understanding relates to communication. In the Methods section 
above, the assumption was that material investments would require communication with the owner 
of the investment throughout the IT investment-business value equation. However, this proved not 
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to be the case. Communication almost immediately ceased after solutions were released. This is 
revealing in a couple ways. First, realizing firm value either was not a driver for behavior or the 
required value was perceived to have been achieved at “go-live.” The second interesting point arising 
from this evidence is that for practice to participate with academia to improve performance, their 
behavior and operating practices will have to change and will need to begin tracking technology 
investments throughout the realization and validation of benefits. The need for longitudinal studies 
is evident. Costs incurred as a result of changes to technology will also have to be tracked, as firms 
may not discover any negative impacts until years after implementation. In addition, organizations 
will not learn if they are not engaged in follow-up discussions after investments are delivered. This is 
an opportunity to provide tools and/or a process to close this gap so that organizations can make 
more informed decisions based upon prior performance of their IT investments. 
A surprising finding was that architectural influence wasn’t universally believed to be a 
primary driver for making the best business decisions. For example, P2 supported “slush funds” for 
individual IT teams and business units/functions to do with as they please. Furthermore, while 
communication was highlighted as critical to the success of portfolio management and development 
activities, little experience was shared about the importance of communication during the process of 
business change and value measurement. This lack of communication during benefits validation 
could be a primary cause of business values of specific IT investments not being measured, reported, 
or broadly acknowledged by firms. 
Another interesting finding was that P2 stressed the importance of collocating people when 
they are working on projects. This was unexpected, as P2 is a savvy user of technology and a 
relatively young leader. I expected him to extol the value of virtual technology and the view that it 
increases productivity. He did not, explaining, “I think collocation is really, really important.” The 
recent news that a pioneer of the virtual office, IBM, is requiring all employees to physically be 
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present in the office, as did Yahoo when CEO Marissa Mayer took control, implies that the studies 
and business experts have gotten it wrong and that physical location is a key ingredient for success in 
some firms. I expect that a great deal of research is already under way in order to understand this 
recent change in the valuation of virtual vs. physical participation, and information asymmetry may 
be one reason that collocation is important. 
Finally, this exploratory research served to help formulate the problem. The scope of the 
research project remained broad at this point and a second exploratory study was needed, using a 
more targeted focus. To narrow the scope to the most interesting aspects of the initial findings, I 
focused the next phase of research on the exploration of information asymmetry as it relates to IT 
investment decisions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
UNCOVERING EVIDENCE OF TECHNICAL DEBT AS A CLASS OF 
INFORMATION 
Introduction 
The first step in problem formulation detailed in Chapter 4 informed my understanding of 
the problem and led to the exploration of two concepts: information asymmetry and technical debt. 
While technical debt did not emerge as strong a concept as information asymmetry, it was 
referenced multiple times. The concept of information asymmetry was especially interesting as it 
surfaced as a key finding from the interviews as a contributor to dysfunctional behavior during IT 
investment decision-making and execution. It pointed my next phase of research toward discovering 
more about the concept. 
I performed an abbreviated literature review on the topics of information asymmetry and 
technical debt. This review involved searches for each respective topic in Google Scholar by 
relevance, reading the first thirty article abstracts for each, and reading the entire articles for a select 
group that seemed most relevant to this research. As a nascent area of knowledge, technical debt 
articles were searched based upon relevance AND being published since 2014.  
Two articles proved especially useful. For information asymmetry, Akerlof’s (1978) seminal 
paper informed my understanding of the problem and served as an anchor to which I could ground 
the problem and this research study. The second article (Alves et al., 2016) defined 15 types of 
technical debt that served as a taxonomy to which we could align the type of information 
comprising the gaps we discovered in practice. 
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Research Method 
This second study was a continuation of the problem formulation stage of ADR. While my 
first set of interviews provided a broad appreciation for the issues related to making poor IT 
investment solutions, I had to pivot from the model I introduced as my area of focus was too broad. 
Therefore, I designed a second set of interviews with a more targeted problem statement. My 
second data collection effort sought to answer the following question: 
RQ: 1. How do information asymmetries between business and IT affect IT investment 
decisions? 
Interviews were conducted with four leaders of IT investment, each responsible for 
investment in excess of $100 million per annum. Their companies’ 2017 revenues ranged from $1.5 
billion to $61 billion. In addition to being accountable for the execution of strategic IT investment 
decisions, these executives were selected because they led areas that owned much of the information 
that was leveraged to make strategic IT investment decisions. The interviews were semi-structured 
and consisted of the questions listed in Appendix F. Semi-structured interview questions were 
developed following the approach described by Merriam and Tisdell (2015), where “neither the 
exact wording nor the order of the questions is determined ahead of time.” Merriam and Tisdell 
(2015) explained that this approach “allows the researcher to respond to the situation at hand, to the 
emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas on the topic.” This approach could not 
have been more appropriate for my data collection, as one of the participants had an unanticipated 
response when he asserted that he did not have long-range planning data, that he only relied on one-
year plans, and that he rebuilds them each year. This was unanticipated: an executive accountable for 
billions of dollars in annual information technology spending did not have plans longer than one 
year in advance. If a highly structured interview approach had been employed, this insight may not 
have surfaced, or at a minimum would not have been explored. 
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All interviews were transcribed using a transcription service. Following the transcription of 
interview text, software called QDA Miner was employed to qualitatively code the text, and an 
approach outlined in Saldana (2015) and detailed in Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) was followed. 
The coding method is called Elaborative Coding and it is a second cycle, also called top-down, 
coding method. 
This second cycle method of coding relied upon the previous coding from the first study as 
a starting point for the second study’s coding. I leveraged the technical debt taxonomy (Alves et al., 
2016) to serve as the initial coding. While new themes emerged, to keep the scope of this research 
project manageable, I only used the technical debt types and the text that mapped to them to 
complete the formulation of the problem and inform the next phase of this research project. 
Data Analysis 
This phase of the research project identified gaps that are filled during the creation of an 
instrument. This instrument is expected to help organizations reduce information asymmetry in IT 
investment decision-making. The data collected in this second study provided empirical evidence 
supporting the existence of information asymmetry comprised of nine of the 15 types of technical 
debt defined by Alves et al. (2016), which are listed in Appendix A. Figure 6 illustrates the 
concentration of evidence among the nine technical debt types. 
Figure 7 illustrates the concentration mapping of the data collected by Alves et al. (2016) vs. 
the data collected in this study. The evidence collected in this study was significantly concentrated in 
four technical debt types: Requirement, Documentation, Infrastructure, and Architecture. Intuitively, 
a significant variance in concentration was expected as academic research—the source of the 
literature examined by Alves et al. (2016)—has primarily focused on debt accumulated during the 
coding process within a software development project. Only recently has the term technical debt 
been recognized as a metaphor for unplanned costs associated with information system changes that 
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are not code-centered, e.g., people, requirement, infrastructure, etc. In addition, in January 2018, Bill 
Curtis, Executive Director of CISQ, acknowledged, “Industry defines technical debt differently than 
academia” (Curtis, 2018). CISQ is the Consortium for Software Quality and was co-founded in 2010 
by Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute and OMG. 
 
Figure 6. Concentration of coded text within the technical debt taxonomy. 
 
Figure 7. Alves et al.’s (2016) results versus this study’s elaborative coding results. 
 
 
Study 1 - Litereature Mapping (Taxonomy Defined) Study 2 - Interview Quotes (Elaborative Coding)
TD Type Total TD Type Total
Design 42 Design 1
Architecture 30 Architecture 9
Documentation 28 Documentation 19
Test 24 Test 2
Code 21 Code 0
Defect 17 Defect 1
Requirement 4 Requirement 26
Infrastructure 3 Infrastructure 11
People 3 People 1
Test automation 3 Test automation 0
Process 3 Process 0
Build 2 Build 1
Service 2 Service 0
Usability 2 Usability 0
Versioning 1 Versioning 0
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Discussion 
Several key findings were discovered. For example, there is a gap in the information available 
to senior executives in IT about the amount of technical debt being incurred. In addition, the 
interviews highlighted a number of other sources of information asymmetry within IT. As one CIO 
stated, he doesn’t have a roadmap, and instead relies on the direct reports that provide him with the 
priorities entering each year. He also does not track the multi-year effects of prior year investments. 
In addition to discovery, the analysis resulted in identifying the data collected in this effort that 
aligned to a subset of the 15 types of technical debt defined by Alves et al. (2016). 
 In summary, the findings from this data collection, coding, and analysis informed my design 
of the next phase of this research project: solution creation. To this end, the data collected in this 
phase were mapped to the types of technical debt and were used to design an artifact that would 
serve as a solution to the problem of information asymmetry negatively impacting initial strategic IT 
investment decisions. Much of the analysis of the data collected in this phase of the research project 
is detailed in Chapter 6, as the line between problem formulation and design was crossed somewhere 
between completing the coding and analyzing the coding. The completed artifact that lists the 
coding of data from this study serves as the last artifact supporting the problem formulation. 
Following the coding, analysis of the coding generated questions that served as the first content for 
the design of an instrument that was intended to solve the problem. 
  
 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: 
 
TAKING ACTION TO REDUCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: 
INSTRUMENT CREATION 
Introduction 
The evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with leaders that have participated in IT 
investment decisions within large complex organizations informed the creation of an instrument that 
could reduce the amount of information asymmetry between stakeholders during the execution of 
initial strategic IT investment decisions. This instrument was planned to serve as a source of 
potential debt items to be tracked after implementation. An elaborated action design research 
(eADR) approach was employed to co-create the instrument in praxis. The introduction of an 
instrument to capture technical debt information is expected to bring to light hidden costs that, if 
known, may influence decision-making. 
Strategic IT investment decisions are reviewed and approved by the most senior executives 
in an organization. Figure 8 illustrates the typical high-level initial strategic IT investment decision-
making process followed by large complex organizations. 
 
Figure 8. High-level process of making an initial strategic IT investment decision. 
An exploratory study was conducted to understand how IT and business communicated during the 
IT investment decision-making process within large complex organizations (see Chapter 4). Two 
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practitioners with the unique perspective of having had roles as business leaders AND as IT leaders 
within different large complex firms were selected for the study. The exploratory research revealed 
that significant information asymmetry exists between IT and business when making strategic IT 
investment decisions. 
A second study was conducted to discover the types of information that comprise the 
asymmetry (see Chapter 5). Four IT executives at different large complex firms—accountable for 
the IT information shared with a strategic IT investment committee—were interviewed. The 
transcribed interviews were coded using an Elaborative Coding methodology, described by Saldaña, 
(2015), as a second cycle method. A second cycle method is used to elaborate upon a previous study. 
The previous study leveraged for this work was published in a top-tier journal. The article defined 15 
types of technical debt. These technical debt types were used as codes for the second study to 
explore the possibility that they may serve as a classification or taxonomy for the evidence collected. 
The third phase of this research project sought to build an instrument that would close the 
information asymmetry that exists during the strategic IT investment decision-making process. To 
this end, an instrument was created that details the questions to be answered in order to close the 
information asymmetry associated with the relevant technical debt types. The balance of this chapter 
describes the creation and evaluation of the instrument. 
Initial Instrument Design 
The four technical debt types with the largest number of coded interview quotes from the 
research in Chapter 5 were selected to constitute the initial design of the instrument. They had 
significantly more supporting data than the other five types. The goal of the instrument is to reduce 
information asymmetry, with the expectation that more informed decisions lead to better outcomes. 
The steps followed to create the initial version of the instrument include: 
1. Identify the goal of the instrument 
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2. Select a definition for each type of technical debt 
3. Analyze coded transcripts and identify themes informed by consensus—this was 
done independently for each of the four types of technical debt 
4. Design questions expected to reduce information asymmetry related to the themes 
The definitions for each type of technical debt (step two) were taken from Alves et al. (2016) and are 
listed in Appendix A. An example of steps three and four is best understood by reading the 
“Question Derivation – Example” section and reviewing the analysis in Table 2 below, which 
identifies the subtypes of information used to generate questions for the Requirements Debt section 
of the artifact. The questions were designed to close the type of information summarized by the 
subtype classification. 
Question Derivation – Example 
The creation of the questions was informed by consensus themes that surfaced in coded data 
from Chapters 4 and 5. An example of coded comments that were translated into questions is listed 
in Table 2. The Requirement Debt coding was used to create subtypes of codes in the right-hand 
column of Table 2, which served as a basis for formulating questions. The questions were derived 
from applying my experience in practice as a participant in the IT investment decision-making 
experience to the coded comments and creating questions that were targeted at reducing the 
Requirement Debt information asymmetry. No formal process was followed for this exercise; the 
researcher simply interpreted the comments, classified them into subtypes, and formulated 
questions. The initial set of questions served as the baseline content for the instrument. The first 
version of the instrument is provided in Appendix I. 
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Table 2 
Summary information gaps 
  
Coded Comments (Participant ID, Comment Number) Requirement Debt Information Gaps
what is the impact to our people and business processes (P2, 4) Process Impact
then you are relying on the technologists to understand the business 
process (P1, 3) Process Impact
on the technology side there isn't really anybody that understands what 
the business is trying to do from a broad perspective (P1, 6) Enterprise Impact
It was incredible to me that you couldn't find a single soul in the business 
that understood that process (P2, 16) Process Impact
there are so many details, there are so many things that if you don’t 
know some of the gotcha’s or some of the pitfalls, you really can get in 
trouble from a project perspective (P1, 19)
General Details (Interpreted primarily as 
data and process impacts)
If I see processes not well documented, I'm putting a big red flag up (P3, 
303) Process Impact
And at each level, I guess the details becomes less, and the abstraction 
becomes greater. So once you get to the CEO level, we're probably 
looking at things more like the investment categories (P4, 402) Complete Lack of Detailed Information
we've just realized we do like reporting to the Brazilian Central Bank from 
it, and we weren't factored into the plans (P4, 408) Data and Process Impact
people get bullied by the business into doing whatever the business want 
to do. And like you say, you wake up one morning in five years' time 
realizing that there are a lot of things that should have been done along 
the way, and now you've got a massive legacy problem (P4, 419) General Requirement Impact
nobody seemed to be accountable for looking down the road more than 
one year (P5, 502) Medium to Long-Term Requirement Impact
how many departments do you have to include to actually pull off a piece 
of work? That was not formalized in any sort of database (P5, 507)
Enterprise Impact (Also Documentation 
Debt)
There's a consensus that there's not really a need to spend the overhead 
in trying to evaluate what's right because they all are in such violent 
agreement about "We need this, we need this, we need this (P6, 603) Lack of Detailed Requirements
What we've had to do in the case of the retail business is build an entire 
product management function whose job it is to solicit the ideas of all the 
different variations because invariably what we'd get is, we'd have one 
expert FA tell us "This is absolutely what we need as a group and if we 
don't have this we're going to go out of business." And then we'd have 
another expert advisor, just as accomplished, say the opposite (P6, 607) Competing Requirements
the sum of the parts of what people agree need to get done and funded, 
is more than what the CEO's willing to fund. We in IT try to put that 
burden back on the business to arbitrate and to decide what not to fund 
(P6, 609)
Requirement Feasibilty Not Vetted Against 
Technology
 Even in cases where they are collaborating, I think it is plausible in 
circumstances where the domain is not well understood, that even with 
best efforts and best communication, there's just a general lack of 
familiarity with depth of the problem (P6, 613) Process and Data Impact
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Iterative Design – Cycle One 
Following the initial design of the instrument, the content was introduced to a practitioner to 
engage in practice-centered design. The list of six participants from both sets of interviews was 
reviewed and the participant identified for participation in the iterative design of the instrument was 
selected due to his distinct roles, listed below: 
1. Chair of the strategic IT investment committee within IT 
2. Owner of the content provided to the investment committee within IT 
3. Owner of the IT investment decision-making process within IT 
4. Owner of the content supplied by IT to the enterprise strategic IT investment 
committee 
This professional was the only participant fulfilling all four of these roles, thereby providing 
unique insight into the entire strategic IT investment decision-making ecosystem. His organization 
invested approximately $750 million in technology spending in each of the years 2013-2017. 
For the initial review of the instrument’s proposed content, the practitioner was shown the 
first page of the instrument. This step aligned with entry into the ADR process at the design stage, 
what is termed an Objective Centered entry point by Mullarkey and Hevner (2018). The discussion 
with the participant focused on what a better artifact would accomplish. The practitioner-researcher 
discussion included assessing the feasibility of building and using such an artifact. The discussion 
revealed how this artifact would complement current artifacts employed by practice. I consciously 
limited the supporting quotes for each type of technical debt and only included one from the 
participant for this phase of the research. This was done to ensure the evidence resonated and the 
examples provided were validated from an independent standpoint with a detached objectivity. 
Using the participant’s quotes may have muddied the context and prevented the required focus on 
the design activity, as he may have become distracted reliving experiences in his mind. Appendix I 
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includes the content reviewed with the participant. The bracketed text after each quote was not 
provided to the participant for review; instead, it was added to this dissertation to provide support 
for the appropriateness of the quote for the type of technical debt. 
Table 3 
Results of first practitioner-researcher design iteration 
 
 The iterative design consisted of two rounds of review and discussion. Each iteration 
included design, implementation, and evaluation. Implementation and evaluation were simulated for 
Content Area Selected Feedback Discussion Led to Agreement of Content Modification Added To:
Instrument Overview I know that my company, they're kind of looking at test 
automation, DevOps, and just a complete investment in 
automation as a silver bullet...That stuck out to me right away 
and I believe that if you automate something that still doesn't 
have architecture documentation or design you're just 
propagating a problem faster.
Add
Does this investment have a test automation and/or DevOps 
component?  If so, when is the automation and DevOps 
design planned as it relates to the major milestones of the 
investment?
Architecture Debt
Requirement Debt I think if your instrument, maybe need a bit of an enterprise 
architecture view in terms of capabilities, how they start off 
with the drivers and the goals and the capabilities that the 
firm needs to have, and how these investments are 
contributing to those capabilities on a master view.
Add
What are the enterprise-level drivers for this investment?
What are the enterprise-level capabilities that will be enhanced 
as a result of this investment?  What is the source of the 
definition and management of the capabilities? 
Requirement Debt
Infrastructure What I'm thinking is that I think there's probably facets of 
these that you'll get answers for right away, particularly if it's a 
software system. It'll be talking about the functionality of the 
software system but those people won't care about if it's 
running on this type of network or network equipment, down 
to the switches and routers and storage and the other stuff 
that really can be tremendously impactful to the overall 
execution performance of the system. I guess what I'm trying 
to say is that most times those systems are made up with 
software and then you got storage, compute, CPU and all 
those types of things. Those things are just, "Oh, that's the IT 
stuff and infrastructure stuff that somebody else handles," 
and you've got to look at the complete picture.
Add
Which type of technologies comprise the in-scope switches, 
routers and storage?  How will this investment alter the 
profile of these technologies and instantiation of the 
infrastructure architecture?
Infrastructure 
Debt
Infrastructure It's too complicated and it's too early. I would say that a lot of 
these big investments are being made before any designs can 
be done. Well how can I tell you what the impact to storage is 
when you haven't even designed it yet? Right? And it's almost 
like the investment cycle itself is too compressed in a short 
amount of time with a bunch of assumptions, right? And I 
can appreciate that you have to start there but you can't leave 
it there.
Add
When did you begin preparing this investment proposal?
How much time do you need to adequately identify the 
information required from the questions comprising this 
instrument?
Instructions
Architecture Yeah, checking with a party, independent third party. Maybe 
not ... it's an independent third party is good but also your 
partners. They're not independent because they have the 
material investment in your success [inaudible 00:39:19] 
vendor but you shouldn't discount that because it's not third 
party, right? You know what I mean.....I mean I would say in 
a particular way, that resonates with a lot of IT executives is, 
"Look, I've been spending millions of dollars with Cisco for 
years and years. I have to trust them. Or what kinds of saps 
are we?" You got to value their opinion.
Add
Have our technology partners provided a thorough review of 
the proposal?
Architecture Debt
Documentation Right. And some of the questions I think you should be 
asking in this section ...in terms of producing documentation 
so that you can understand the systems and the impacts is 
you got to ask those questions. Well how does it effect the 
lower levels of technology that people normally assume are 
just going to be there?
Add
Does this investment impact lower levels of technology that 
people normally assume are going to be there?
Architecture Debt
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reasons explained in Chapter 3. The first review included introducing each section of the instrument 
included in Appendix I separately, by asking the participant to read the section. Once he had read 
the section, some context was provided, and the following open-ended question was asked to solicit 
feedback: “What are your thoughts?” The iterative discussion about the content led to 
recommendations for changes in the content, listed in Table 3 below. Table 3 includes the co-
created changes to the instrument content believed to provide actionable insights to improve the 
instrument based upon the participant’s expertise. The dialogue for this first round of review during 
this design session lasted 43 minutes. The conversation was recorded and transcribed. The 
transcription was used to validate handwritten notes taken by the researcher. 
Following the initial review of each section of the content, the participant was asked to 
review the content again and to consider a recent investment decision that would have been altered 
had he employed the instrument. He identified a situation and his feedback included the following. 
[We were] talking about moving in the cloud. And in order for us to move the cloud, what 
do we need to? What capabilities do we need to have to actually make that happen? That was 
all done at buzz word level…In order to really make that happen, we had to invest in 
automation, DevOps, and probably Agile. We got to change our networks. We have to have 
a culture change. We have to have people [with expertise] we don’t have … just because you 
were a good engineer on-prem doesn’t mean you’re instantly a good engineer in the cloud. 
The availability of outside expertise and things. Those are all important things. 
For example, the cloud transformation thing was a $12 million investment and it was like, 
“They’ll take care of everything.” Well wait a minute, we can’t take care of automation across 
the entire company. We can’t take care of Agile across the entire company. We can’t take 
care of resilience. That’s another big one. Cloud has to be resilient. Someone’s like, ‘there’s 
somebody that’s in charge of resilience and disaster recovery and things like that. But they 
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have other concerns. They’re concerned about other things and there’s things like resilience 
[that] is not something that a cloud component can take care of by itself. It’s the application 
that’s using cloud components that has to be done resilient versus the underlying 
infrastructure. None of those things were understood and so you got into it until they hit a 
brick wall and said, “Wait a minute. We can’t do tier one [applications].” There’s a lot of 
reasons why we can’t do tier one. But the going in assumption was we could. But there’s just 
a lot of hand waving and a lot of assumptions being made that they’ll figure it out. And that’s 
where, that’s again, if you start off with not understanding what the entire enterprise looks 
like, and what are all the different capabilities that are required to do something, you can’t 
even put together a good plan. 
Well, that’s how their business cases get approved too. “Well, Mr. CIO, I mean, we’ve got to 
do cloud, right?” “Oh yeah, we’ve got to do cloud.” “Sign the check.” Without 
understanding what that really means. Which application, specifically, are you talking about? 
Right? And is there a roadmap for that portfolio of applications. 
Following the explanation of how the instrument would have improved a recent investment 
decision, the participant was asked why he thinks executives did not make the right decision despite 
probably being smart people. He explained that, 
I think it’s such a hard thing to conceptualize. There’s so many details, so many 
dependencies that when you’re trying to make an investment decision in a 6-week period of 
time, July every year, you don’t have time to do all of that analysis. Somebody will figure it 
out. I think that’s the default position. I think the other thing too is not just understanding 
kind of what your current state is. That’s a big thing. I would say most companies don’t 
understand what their current state is in terms of what their capabilities are, how old their 
equipment is, in an easy to understand wall chart. You know what I mean? A poster. Say, 
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“Oh, okay. We’re talking about this over here. We’re talking about this application over here 
that uses this storage, this many mainframes.” Ideally this is something that is always 
maintained, always available. But when you start figuring out what the impacts are to the 
proposed investment, to that infrastructure, that needs to start earlier in that little window 
where everybody has to put together their business cases. 
Yeah, and it’s so frustrating. And they also don’t understand what goes wrong either. They 
make the assumptions that this is a good investment and when it goes wrong, they also can’t 
understand what goes wrong. It’s pretty ridiculous. But I can appreciate where you get into a 
position where you just have to make a decision, with the best available data, and the best 
available data is pretty weak most times. 
 While the participant was able to evaluate the instrument’s utility by articulating the cloud 
situation and the impact of information asymmetry due to not having the necessary information to 
make a better decision, he also shared one of the reasons that it is challenging. He believes that 
executives struggle to gain an appreciation for all relevant data because it is not maintained and 
because CIOs and CTOs have an average duration in their jobs of, “two to four years or something 
like that.” While this statistic has not been validated, if his experience is remotely consistent with the 
actual numbers, it is easy to see why executives who do not work within IT are disadvantaged. This 
is due to extreme information asymmetry, if key technical people are rotating out when they gain any 
depth of understanding in the company’s technology. The leaders they depend on to provide them 
with technical information have not been around that long. This key reflection and learning 
informed the next iteration of the instrument design and creation. One final point of note involves 
an observation regarding the participant’s body language—leaning forward—and tone of his voice: 
they led me to believe he was genuinely excited about the content.  
 53 
 
Following the documentation and review of the feedback received during the first review of 
the instrument, each of the points in Table 2 were discussed with the participant during a follow-up 
phone call. This validation of content included a back-and-forth dialogue. While the review did not 
immediately yield additional recommended modifications to the questionnaire, several insights were 
surfaced, which are expected to improve the effectiveness of the instrument. The primary insight 
discovered during this round of design was the identification of a new gap: a lack of identification of 
strategic capabilities that strategic IT investment decisions must affect. While stated in varying ways 
from the participant throughout our interaction, the following comments from him summarize the 
point: 
… you hear automation as a buzz word, “Hey, let’s make an investment in 
automation,” but oftentimes that’s where the discussion ends and, “Oh, the IT 
people will figure it out.” Really, there’s a driver there. Somebody in their head, 
either implicitly or explicitly has said, “Hey, we’ve got to deliver things faster, more 
reliably.” It has to have an audit trail, an automated audit trail of everything that was 
going on with these systems. Reduce mistakes, reliability, repeatability, and all those 
types of things. That’s what people are thinking in their head, but they never write 
that down and they never tie it to a specific example of, “Hey, our customers on the 
street are always complaining that it takes us a year to add three fields to a CSCI 
screen somewhere.” Those become the drivers and the requirements. 
Okay, but now when it comes to [invest in] IT, okay, we’re talking about automation. 
What do we actually need to do? What capabilities do we have? Well, we have 
capabilities at the point of testing of building infrastructure and things like that. How 
are we as far as automation goes across those IT capabilities? If you get a RAG [Red, 
Amber, Green] status on them, “Well, we’re red here,” meaning it’s ad-hoc. “Yellow 
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here,” there’s some automation, “green here,” it’s fully automated. That’s what I 
mean. There’s kind of a landscape of why are we doing it and kind of [with] what 
capabilities, and those capabilities are kind of a simplistic view of the business 
capabilities, plus the actual logical and technical implementation of those capabilities, 
right? 
When these folks are making investment decisions, a lot of times they have the 
discussion one on one with this sponsor or this interested party and then they move 
over here and talk to this sponsor and this interested party, but without the map that 
ties it all together, “Hey, wait a minute. You guys are talking about, at least in part, 
the same thing,” and so there’s overlap there. 
 While I have incorporated questions that attempt to discover enterprise drivers and 
capabilities into the superordinate version of the instrument in Appendix J, more research is 
required to flesh out the phenomena. For example, how can organizations design an effective set of 
enterprise drivers and capabilities with measures to drive investment at lower levels? This may 
ultimately result in an enhanced version of the instrument, although it may warrant a discrete 
instrument with a broader goal (see Chapter 7). 
In summary, while having perfect information is not possible due to extremely high costs, 
combined with the fluid nature of evolving information system instantiations, the following 
statement from the participant captures the need to do better:  
… there is a bare minimum level of information that you do have to know in order to make 
the right decision. You don’t need to catalog the blackberries and the mice and keyboards 
and stuff like that, but you do need to understand—intimately—your major platforms, your 
major big pieces of software and hardware….  
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The goal of this instrument is to improve this understanding, primarily at the executive level to 
ensure more informed strategic IT investment decisions are made. 
 These more informed decisions could only reasonably be made if this new information to be 
included in business cases is captured and maintained on an ongoing basis. As the participant 
explained,  
… and that’s the point you should make about the architecture debt and the documentation 
debt and things like that is that stuff needs to live on beyond the people. Right? When the 
new person comes in, are they going to start from scratch learning all that stuff? Or do you 
have that continuum. 
Iterative Design – Cycle Two 
The second iteration of the design of the instrument was conducted with the same 
participant that took part in the first design iteration. This final design session approached the design 
exercise by asking the participant to review the instrument line-by-line and offer his view of each 
line of content. This design session took 122 minutes. It was recorded and transcribed. The version 
of the instrument reviewed during this session is included in Appendix G. 
 The primary product of this design phase is included as Appendix H. The changes detailed 
in Appendix H were made to the instrument and the final version of the artifact is included in 
Appendix J. Due to the nature of this artifact being a static document to complement a process that 
already exists in practice, there was no formal line between the design and build phases of eADR. 
When the design was complete, the artifact had been built. This is akin to an agile software 
development process, where pieces of the software are delivered and tested as design continues to 
unfold. 
The questions designed for the instrument are expected to add information to a business 
case that is not typically included when making strategic IT investment decisions. The answers to the 
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questions for each type of technical debt serve as a treatment. The research approach employed 
designed and simulated implementation by asking, “What is your reflection of using the 24 questions 
and how would it have affected your decision?” The hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: If information on technical debt is added to the business case, better strategic IT 
investment decisions are made. 
I tested the hypothesis by: 
1. Constructing an instrument 
2. Picking an example strategic IT investment decision 
3. Simulating introduction of technical debt information using the instrument 
4. Modifying the instrument 
5. Evaluating the modified instrument 
Evidence in the form of the participant’s evaluation includes two examples of reflection 
where the participant identified prior strategic IT investment decisions that did not result in 
expected value. He explained that if this instrument had been used and the information asymmetry 
had been reduced as a result, better outcomes would have occurred. The first investment involved 
1,600 AIX servers that were not kept current. This infrastructure debt was not discussed until it was 
too late. The impact was not only a delay in another strategic investment. Due to the amount of 
money that needed to be spent in the current budget to cover the unplanned upgrade, the 
organization was unable to fund several growth investments. The participant explained,  
… my favorite example is upgrading AIX in the middle of a broader program which was to 
completely eliminate AIX and move to virtual Linux. Because they hadn’t, because they 
weren’t planning and maintaining the overall age of the major platforms within the stack, 
they found themselves painted into a corner where they had to upgrade 1,600 AIX servers in 
the midst of a plan that was actually decommissioning those servers. 
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He continued, “They found themselves at a point where they couldn’t even make a decision 
anymore. They just had to do it.” The participant elaborated on the impact by explaining the 
strategic IT investment decision-making process at his firm. He explained,  
… suppose you are our CIO and you have 20 investments coming to the table to be put in, 
right? Any one of those investments that was planning on leveraging AIX and they get to the 
aging question and they get to the architecture question that’s going to, right then and 
there that would’ve caught it.  
This evidence reveals that employing the artifact would have resulted in a better strategic IT 
investment decision. Prior year investments would have uncovered the aging of these servers and 
forced prioritization earlier, as long-range strategic plans to migrate to Linux were being discussed. 
The participant further validated the value the instrument would have provided by stating, “Yeah, 
they would have said, ‘Hey, wait a minute before we commit ourselves to five more years of being 
on this platform. Is there a way that we can change this investment to instead build it on Virtual 
Linux?’” Every investment that did not discover the plan to migrate off of AIX assumed it would 
just be there, and the parties involved continued to design and build their solutions to run on AIX. 
In addition, the impact on other investments was compounded, because now they all have to 
upgrade and there are limited opportunities to do so in a year. For example, weekends are required 
for enterprise disaster recovery exercises, which consume many of the weekends available for other 
investments. Therefore, they have to push out all the delivery dates for their investments that are 
now saddled with upgrading AIX. 
The second validation of the instrument’s value involved a strategic IT investment his firm 
made to move to the cloud. He explained, 
The example that I would’ve used would’ve been cloud where in moving major workloads to 
the cloud, people made the assumption that if you were an expert in on-prem technology 
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such as a database or something, that automatically you’re an expert in cloud database. And I 
think that the timing and the investments and people would’ve been much different had that 
been understood ahead of time. It also would have caused them to think well, who is going 
to do this work. And in reality, what happened was we got in a situation where they’re trying 
to put tier one applications into the cloud and realized that they didn’t know how they were 
going to solve some fundamental problems like resiliency and things like that. And there’s a 
lot of trial and error and experimentation and a lot of money wasted. Versus bringing in the 
right architects and the right engineers ahead of time to put together a plan that actually 
would’ve gotten them to the right place. 
Yeah… cloud would’ve been a big one, right? And it would’ve been a big one because some 
people have the notion that “hey, we’re going to save a lot of money by moving to the 
cloud.” And there were a lot of assumptions about hey, we can shut down our data centers 
by moving to cloud. We can save $80 to $120 million a year in the bill of IT by moving to 
the cloud. And because a lot of this homework wasn’t done, they found it just easier to not 
methodically plan a migration from the data center SYS ID by SYS ID [system ID] but to 
instead take an opportunistic approach, hey just whoever is ready to move to the cloud, let’s 
let them. Let’s publish a cloud first policy and then let’s just let applications whenever they 
have a reason to upgrade or something let’s have them upgrade to the cloud. And the impact 
of that was you’re no longer looking at the total cost of ownership of your on-prem 
investment, but you now have kind of shifted to a new driver or benefit which was agility. I 
can do it faster. I don’t have to wait for those infrastructure folks to build my environments. 
I can build them myself on the cloud. Your expense base went up. There was a lot of 
thrashing on even figuring out how to make it work. And yeah, at the end of the day, you’re 
just so far away from actually saving, lowering the bill of IT. 
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He summed it up by clarifying the value the instrument would have had: “So thinking it all the way 
through. And being consistent. And not just assuming that magic will happen is a big part of it. I 
think it’s a pretty good example.” 
An important additional learning that occurred during reflection on the artifact and 
employing it included the participant explaining how he would use the instrument. He shared, “I 
would probably provide it to them ahead of time, but it would require interviews and probing 
questions.” He elaborated by highlighting the need for the “right person” to conduct the probing 
interviews to populate the instrument. He shared the following when asked who the right person is. 
Well, I think it would be multiple people. I think it would be probably like CTO or 
somebody down a level from the CTO that’s actually familiar with where they spend their 
money, what platforms and stuff. So, it’d be someone like that and it would also be probably 
somebody from like the BMOs, business management offices. It would be somebody from 
architecture. Yeah, so I think it’s a representative from the technology side and the business, 
the IT business side. In other words, how much do our services cost? That person and then 
the architect, which is the person that’s saying what technology we are using and how to 
rationalize that and how it makes sense. So, I guess those are the two main interest groups. 
Evidence of perceived information asymmetry reduction comprising four types of technical 
debt will improve the strategic IT investment decision-making process. Engagement with practice 
resulted in the participant favorably perceiving the value of the instrument.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Contributions 
In answering both high-level research questions posed in Chapter 2, this research 
contributed to practice and knowledge in multiple ways. Primarily for practice, it delivered an 
instrument that improves strategic IT investment decisions. It also revealed consistent behavior 
across several large complex firms, where information asymmetry negatively impacts not only 
strategic IT investment decisions, but also other types of decisions, and stunts the maturation 
process of organizations. Finally, it identified the need for a process where information collected via 
the instrument is regularly maintained, not only to ensure it is shared and included in decision-
making, but also to impact non-strategic investments. If relevant parties were made aware of this 
information, they would likely also make better decisions. The information collected through the 
instrument serves to identify and quantify the contingent liability that exists, which is not effectively 
understood, let alone managed, by large complex firms. 
This research project has also made several contributions to knowledge. First, it broadened 
the application of information asymmetry to a new domain; information technology. This may open 
avenues for research across domains, as information asymmetry occurs wherever humans are 
required to make joint decisions. This research applied it in a novel way and provided a solution. 
This research serves as evidence supporting the relatively new body of knowledge known as 
elaborated action design research. It may be the first research project to employ a hybrid 
ADR/eADR method. I recommend using this approach of transitioning methodology from ADR to 
eEDR when researchers discover they will not be able to implement a solution within a reasonable 
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period of time. Publishing findings prior to completing solution implementation and evaluation may 
prove to advance knowledge more rapidly than waiting. Finally, this research provided evidence to 
support the recently defined types of technical debt (Alves et al., 2016). In addition, the evidence 
reveals an even broader definition and provides examples that define broader definitions for four of 
the 15 types of technical debt. 
Discovering the drivers for information gaps between the business and IT was a 
contribution practice could leverage. Organizations are now aware of the materiality of the impact 
these gaps have on their ability to communicate effectively. 
Limitations 
Due to the small number of participants, there is a risk that the findings from this study are 
not generalizable. However, the complementary findings from coded transcripts of all six 
participants found no outliers when it came to formulating the problem. In addition, until the 
instrument is put into practice and empirical evidence is gathered to reveal its performance, the 
relative value of the instrument is not known. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
One natural extension of this research is to investigate the strategic IT investment decisions 
that occur throughout the life of an investment, i.e., beyond the initial investment decision that was 
the focus of this dissertation. For example, strategic IT investments have opportunities to 
“renegotiate” their terms; perhaps applying what Roberts’ (2015) discovered about renegotiation 
behavior in financial contracting would benefit IT investments. Another area of research that may 
prove fruitful is budgetary slack, which is extensively discussed within the accounting field where 
Van der Stede’s (2000) study of the effects of managerial short-term orientation as it relates to 
budgetary slack may support targeting the short-term effects that incentivize “sellers” highlighted in 
this dissertation. Another interesting study by Fisher et al. (2002), explores information asymmetry 
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effects on budgetary proposals, budget slack, and performance. This research is complementary and 
may help to build upon the phenomena examined by this dissertation. Technical debt may be a 
primary contributor to people maintaining unhealthy levels of budgetary slack. This research also 
supports future research ideas suggested by Stablein et al. (2018), where they view Arrow’s (1985) 
seminal work on the behavior of physicians and moral hazard as potentially having a similar effect 
within IT organizations, where the incentive to behave in a negative way following a strategic IT 
investment is high. 
While I have incorporated some questions into the superordinate version of the instrument 
in Appendix J that discover drivers and capabilities, there is more research required to flesh out the 
phenomenon briefly described in Chapter 6. The phenomenon can be described as a requirement to 
have a direct link between IT investments and enterprise level value drivers. This connection is too 
often one of platitudes without measurable linkage. This may ultimately result in an enhanced 
version of the instrument, although it may warrant a discrete instrument with a broader goal. 
While the instrument has direct value, as perceived by the practitioner that participated in its 
design and evaluation and as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, one insight surfaced 
repeatedly throughout the engagement: “you have to map out the IT organization to understand 
what are the big things I need to be concerned about, from an architectural perspective, and use that 
as context for these investment decisions.” Future research will benefit from exploring how 
enterprise frameworks and tools targeted at providing this mapping, e.g., IT-CMF, TOGAF, etc., 
and employed by large complex firms, are (at least in the case of the firm employing the participant 
who co-created the artifact) failing to deliver the intended information and insights required to drive 
improved investment decisions. 
A final area of future research and perhaps the most exciting involves measuring technical 
debt throughout the lifecycle of an investment. It is reasonable to believe that different types of 
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technical debt occur more frequently at different points during an investment’s lifecycle. For 
example, requirement debt may occur quite frequently during the initial planning of an investment, 
design debt may be concentrated during the design of a solution, code debt will be incurred during 
development, test debt will be high during testing, and infrastructure debt accumulates after a 
technical solution begins to age. 
In conclusion, large complex organizations spend significant amounts of their annual 
budgets fixing and maintaining investments in IT assets. Typically, IT assets are implemented under 
pressures to deliver on time and within a prescribed budget. Inevitably, this results in cutting corners 
and doing things the easiest or fastest way, resulting in hidden future costs for supporting and 
adapting the technology. This recurring expense reduces agility and increases opportunity costs. 
With the need to invest in emerging transformational technologies, e.g., blockchain, IoT, AI, 
machine learning, etc., opportunity costs have significantly grown. Exploring how trade-offs are 
made between quick and easy implementation of IT assets and the future costs, or technical debt, of 
fixing and maintaining these assets may lead to more profitable IT investment. 
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Appendix A: Types of Technical Debt from Alves et al. (2016)
 
Type Definition
Design debt Refers to debt that can be discovered by analyzing the source code and identifying violations of 
the principles of good object-oriented design (e.g. very large or tightly coupled classes).
Architecture debt Refers to the problems encountered in product architecture, for example, violation of 
modularity, which can affect architectural requirements (performance, robustness, among 
others). Normally this type of debt cannot be paid off with simple interventions in the code, 
implying more extensive development activities.
Documentation debt Refers to the problems found in software project documentation and can be identiﬁed by 
looking for missing, inadequate, or incomplete documentation of any type.
Test debt Refers to issues found in testing activities that can affect the quality of those activities. Examples 
of this type of debt are planned tests that were not run, or known deﬁciencies in the test suite.
Code debt Refers to the problems found in the source code that can negatively affect the legibility of the 
code making it more diﬃcult to maintain. Usually, this debt can be identiﬁed by examining the 
source code for issues related to bad coding practices.
Defect debt Refers to known defects, usually identiﬁed by testing activities or by the user and reported on 
bug tracking systems, that the Conﬁguration Control Board (CCB) agrees should be ﬁxed but, 
due to competing priorities and limited resources, have to be deferred to a later time. Decisions 
made by the CCB to defer addressing defects can accumulate a signiﬁcant amount of TD for a 
product, making it harder to ﬁx them later.
Requirements debt Refers to tradeoffs made with respect to what requirements the development team needs to 
implement or how to implement them. Some examples of this type of debt are: requirements 
that are only partially implemented, requirements that are implemented but not for all cases, 
requirements that are implemented but in a way that doesn’t fully satisfy all the non-functional 
requirements (e.g. security, performance,  etc.).
Infrastructure debt Refers to infrastructure issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder 
some development activities. Some examples of this kind of debt are delaying an upgrade or 
infrastructure ﬁx.
People debt Refers to people issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder some 
development activities. An example of this kind of debt is expertise concentrated in too few 
people, as an effect of delayed training and/or hiring.
Test automation debt Refers to the work involved in automating tests of previously developed functionality to support 
continuous integration and faster development cycles. This debt can be considered a subtype of 
test debt.
Process debt Refers to ineﬃcient processes, e.g. what the process was designed to handle may be no longer 
appropriate.
Build debt Refers to issues that make the build task harder, and unnecessarily time consuming. The build 
process can involve code that does not contribute to value to the customer. Moreover, if the 
build process needs to run ill-deﬁned dependencies, the process becomes unnecessarily slow. 
When this occurs, one can identify build debt.
Service debt Refers to the inappropriate selection and substitution of web services that lead to mismatch of 
the service features and applications’ requirements. Besides, this type of debt also leads to under- 
or overutilization of the system by integrating a service that does not use the system resources in 
the expected way (for instance, lack of memory due to a service that does not follow the 
expected data processing process, or lack of performance due to a service that does not use the 
available memory for the task). This kind of debt is relevant for systems with service-oriented 
architectures.
Usability debt Refers to inappropriate usability decisions  that will need to be adjusted later. Examples of this 
debt are lack of usability standard and inconsistence among navigational aspects of the software.
Versioning debt Refers to problems in source code versioning, such as unnecessary code forks.
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Appendix B: Muma College of Business Journal Ranking 
 
 
ISDS Journals 
Premier Journals 
Information Systems Research 
Management Science 
MIS Quarterly 
INFORMS Journal on Computing 
Top Tier Journals 
Information & Management 
Journal of MIS 
Decision Support Systems 
European Journal of Information Systems 
Information Systems 
Information & Software Technology 
Journal of AIS 
Journal of information technology 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 
Information Sciences 
ACM Transactions on MIS 
Non-Discipline Based Journals by Related Areas 
Faculty Can Make a Case for Premier Status 
Computer Science Operations Management 
ACM Transactions on KDD Journal of Operations Management 
ACM Transactions on Info Systems Production & Operations Management 
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering Operations Research 
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge &Data 
Engineering Mfg. & Service Operations Management 
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering Math Programming 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, & 
Cybernetics Omega 
 Naval Research Logistics 
Statistics European J. of Operations Research 
Journal of American Statistical Association Computers and OR 
Journal of the Royal Statistical society- Series A, B, 
C Decision Sciences 
Annals of Statistics  
Statistical Science Healthcare 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics J. of the American Medical Association 
Annals of Probability J. of the American Medical Informatics Association 
International Journal of Forecasting  
Annals of Applied Statistics  
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Appendix C: First Set of Interviews – Guiding Set of Interview Questions 
 
a. Describe the type of information technology decisions you have made in the last five years 
that have materially contributed to the information systems architecture of the firm. 
b. Describe the solution options available and primary driving forces behind selection of a 
solution and its underlying technology. 
c. Describe your experiences with IT and Business architects in the decision-making process. 
d. Describe your experiences with business and function stakeholders in the decisions. 
e. Describe your experiences with IT executives in the decisions. 
f. Describe the existence of and reliance upon architectural standards in the decision-making 
process. 
g. Describe the involvement of business and information technology stakeholders not directly 
benefiting from the solution. 
h. Describe your feelings of control of the overall contribution of the IT investments. 
i. Describe your experience managing priorities for your team. 
j. Describe your experiences engaging with resources when it comes time for them to 
contribute to your priorities. 
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Appendix D: Mind Map of Coding 
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Appendix E: Sample Mapping of Data to Themes 
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Appendix F: Second Set of Interviews – Guiding Set of Interview Questions 
Interview questions 
1. Describe the types of IT investment your firm makes on an annual basis. 
2. Describe the IT investment decision-making process at your organization, including the 
roles played by different departments. (If not covered, ask if there is a different process for 
projects/programs that arise throughout the year that weren’t approved during the annual 
budget process) 
3. What level of resources are involved in the IT investment decision-making process at each 
stage? 
4. Describe the inputs required by finance professionals involved in the IT investment 
decision-making process. 
5. Talk me through one good IT investment decision in which you were involved during the 
past 12 months. Share the length of the investment process, information supporting the 
decision, resources involved, and ultimate decision. 
6. Talk me through a bad IT investment decision in which you were involved during the past 
12 months. Share the length of the investment process, information supporting the decision, 
resources involved, and ultimate decision. 
7. How do you measure the risk to successful implementation of an IT investment? 
8. Describe the process by which enterprise-level value is considered during the IT investment 
decision-making process, in contrast to business unit or functional value. 
9. How are benefits tracked for an IT investment? (While this will vary by type of IT 
investment, leaving the question broad may yield insight into how IT versus Finance 
professionals view the importance of tracking benefits) 
10. Do you believe there is asymmetric information between IT and Finance when making IT 
investment decisions? If so, do you believe it materially impacts the decision? 
11. Does trust play a role in the IT investment decision-making process? 
Additional questions: 
1. How much annual IT investment (planned multiyear and annual actual) were you 
accountable for in 2016 and 2017? 
2. What was your role in 2016 and 2017? 
3. Have you worked in the business at any point in your career? If so, for how long and in 
what role(s)? 
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Appendix G: Version 2 of the Instrument Used to Facilitate the Final Design Session 
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Appendix H: Results of the Second Instrument Design Iteration
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Appendix I: Proposed Instrument Content 
 
Instrument goal. At the time a strategic IT investment decision is made, the goal is to 
better understand where an information system is most at risk, through improvements in predicting 
corrective maintenance costs and the quality of applications, prior to approval and implementation. 
Instrument summary description. The instrument includes a description of four types of 
technical debt. The technical debt types are classes of information asymmetry that exist during the 
strategic IT investment decision-making process. This instrument is designed to be incorporated 
into an existing business case artifact or to serve as a standalone artifact to compliment the strategic 
IT investment decision-making process. It requires identification of information that has never been 
or is not consistently shared, which has the potential to cause material debt to be incurred by an 
organization in the form of unexpected maintenance costs supporting the enterprise information 
system if the proposed investment is implemented. 
The taxonomy introduced in Study 1 is extended as a contribution of this research. The 
extension is in the form of subtypes for each technical debt type. The identification of subtypes 
surfaced as the researcher applied his 15+ years of experience to the analysis of the collected data.  
The instrument includes four types of technical debt: requirement debt, documentation debt, 
infrastructure debt, and architecture debt. 
In a perfect world, CIOs and other executives would understand the vocabulary of the 15 
technical debt types. One goal of this research is to develop a taxonomy for the intersection of 
technical debt types and strategic IT investment decisions. 
Requirement Debt 
Definition 
Refers to tradeoffs made with respect to what the requirements the development team needs 
to implement or and how the manner in which to implement them. Some examples of this type of 
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debt are: requirements that are only partially implemented, requirements that are implemented but 
not for in only some all cases, requirements that are implemented but in a way that does not fully 
satisfy all the non-functional requirements (e.g., security, performance, etc.) (Kruchten et al., 2012). 
Exemplar Quotes 
Like years ago, we’re doing a big processor upgrade at a previous bank. It was like the thing 
the bank wanted to do that year on the sales and trading technology drill. I’ve got like 
support of the Board of Directors doing it, and then about a week before we were going to 
do the big, and actually it was an Easter conversion because we needed like, we needed some 
downtime or some Bank Holiday in the UK to get it done. Like a week short of the Easter 
conversion, got an email from somebody in Latin America saying ‘Oh you can’t convert that 
system next week because we’ve just realized we do like reporting to the Brazilian Central 
Bank from it, and we weren’t factored into the plans, and blah, blah, blah, blah.’ Now, 
everybody had had a number of emails. The bank had had emails on this conversion; it was 
like a known, massive, long-term battle for the firm. Yet, you still have things like that that 
pop up. [The instrument is targeted at reducing the information asymmetry that caused the 
Latin American requirements (debt) to be incurred.] 
So that was a large-scale internal product processor upgrade, and to me, though often in our 
industry those are the most difficult things to do. It’s when you have maybe a sub-ledger or a 
product processor that’s got a million plus transactions on it, what we always find is there’s 
another hundred systems connected to it, be it formal or informal, and something like MIS 
spreadsheets, the local reg reporting. Whenever you start to unpick a core processor, you 
find that it will still be like a factor of two, the level of really connections or file transfers 
you’ve got from it versus what the records say. And that’s true for this bank or any of the 
other five banks that work that. [The requirement debt incurred here is a product of not 
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discovering all requirements for the connections to the system being impacted by the 
investment.] 
Questions  
i. How many databases interface with the scope of this effort? 
ii. Was an owner for each database identified? 
iii. Did each owner of a dependent database sign off on the business case? 
iv. What critical processes are driven by data that are integrated between the scope of this effort 
and the rest of the enterprise information system? 
v. How were the critical processes identified? 
vi. Are the critical process dependencies documented? 
vii. Who signed off on the critical processes approving the business case? 
viii. Are the owners of critical dependent processes part of the program governance framework? 
If so, in what capacity? 
Documentation Debt 
Definition 
Refers to problems found in software project documentation and can be identified by 
looking for missing, inadequate, or incomplete documentation of any type (Guo & Seaman, 2011) 
Exemplar Quotes 
A lot of times we also get industry imperatives, which business case doesn’t matter. We get 
regulatory imperatives; business case doesn’t matter. Then we get the expired end of life 
situations where business case doesn’t matter. You have no choice, you have to get off. So, a 
lot of our portfolio is not really up for discretion, even if ... Timing is something that has 
discretion in some cases, but we feel like it’s a little bit easier to navigate that funding 
proposition without having to go to that level of maturity around detailed business case and 
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consequence if the assumptions are wrong. [The lack of documentation for these non-
discretionary investments may be a source of information asymmetry.] 
… it provides opportunities for a lot of skunk works and things like that if they don’t get 
funded through IT for IT but somehow it just magically gets absorbed by these assets. [The 
implication is that skunk works investments are not documented and, if they are, the 
documentation isn’t shared. Either way, this is a source of information asymmetry.] 
So, what I would say is, it depends on the business unit and it depends on the relationship 
with technology in that domain. It also depends a little bit on the complexity of the business. 
So, to give you an example, our retail brokerage business is a lot different than our 
institutional trading business. One of the reasons it’s so much different in terms of the way 
that they consume technology, is that the retail platform has to service 7,500 advisors. The 
institutional platform has to service about 100 traders, and so the variability of demand 
between those two problem statements is really dramatic. It’s much easier to manage without 
a product manager in the institutional business than it is in the retail business. What we’ve 
had to do in the case of the retail business is build an entire product management function 
whose job it is to solicit the ideas of all the different variations because invariably what we’d 
get is, we’d have one expert FA tell us “This is absolutely what we need as a group and if we 
don’t have this we’re going to go out of business.” And then we’d have another expert 
advisor, just as accomplished, say the opposite. [The documentation debt evident in this 
comment is not straightforward. It is hidden in the fact that if documentation were available 
that reconciled the use cases for the current system and aligned them to the functionality 
that was built, it would provide a needed baseline that an organization could use to discover 
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which of the opposing requirements is new and which advisor group should pay for the new 
required functionality.] 
Yeah, I think both circumstances are true in that lack of communication certainly is 
treacherous for estimation, right? If both parties are not collaborating and trying to really get 
to the size and scale question, that’s an issue. Even in cases where they are collaborating, I 
think it is plausible in circumstances where the domain is not well understood, that even 
with best efforts and best communication, there’s just a general lack of familiarity with depth 
of the problem. For instance, I’m thinking of a data problem that we had last year. It was 
poor data quality that we were trying to remediate, and even with the experts involved, there 
was a vast underestimate of how bad the data actually turned out to be. And so, the cleanup 
process was many orders of magnitude more than was originally speculated by the best 
efforts of all parties involved. It’s pretty rare that people overestimate effort though. I would 
say that in all of my years, it’s a rarity. [The documentation debt reflected in this comment 
exists because current state performance metrics do not reveal the state of data. If issues 
with the current data were documented and actively owned and managed by someone, this 
would have informed the team challenged with designing and implementing the new 
investment.] 
Questions  
ix. Were the applications, databases, and networks impacted by or relied on by this 
investment adequately documented prior to the preparation of this business case? If not, 
list the gaps that made generating this business case more complicated and/or time-
consuming. 
x. Has all current and planned work being done in the O&M budget been reviewed as to 
potential impact to this investment? 
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xi. Who owns documenting benefits realization and lessons learned six, 12, or 24 months 
after go-live? 
xii. Is the total cost of ownership of the current and future cost of the impacted and “to-be” 
system understood? Has it been quantified and approved by Finance and IT 
management? (This will have the ancillary benefit of reinforcing the scope of the 
investment.) 
xiii. Have the qualifications (technical, domain, leadership, social/behavioral) of non-IT 
SMEs required for the design and implementation of the investment been documented? 
Evaluated? If evaluated, by whom? 
xiv. Have the qualifications (technical, domain, leadership, social/behavioral) of all technical 
experts required for the design and implementation of the investment been documented? 
Evaluated? If evaluated, by whom? 
Infrastructure Debt 
Definition 
Refers to infrastructure issues that, if present in the software organization, can delay or hinder some 
development activities. Some examples of this kind of debt include delaying an upgrade or 
infrastructure fix. 
Exemplar Quotes 
A bad example would be something like where we upgraded an AIX platform to the latest 
OS’s and patches and things like that while just turning around and executing on a program 
which was to completely get off of AIX platform and onto a virtual Linux. That’s an 
example where they could’ve saved probably a year and a half’s worth of internal labor 
investment and risk to remediate those platforms but because of the corner they painted 
themselves into they had to do it anyway even though they knew that they were getting off 
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of that platform. [This is a straightforward example of aging technology not being kept 
current and the impact being absorbed by the business, which is not able to quickly pivot to 
a new platform.] 
But it’s because that, Thomas, I won’t oversimplify that. That is a constant battle whether it’s 
a year where we think we got a lot of technology dollars, or it’s a year where we think we 
haven’t got a lot of technology dollars, it’s still a constant battle with business requirements 
versus helping the platform. [This is an admission that infrastructure debt is consciously 
absorbed, as keeping the platform current competes with discretionary investments.] 
What you have to do is remind them that “Hey, guys. By the way, we’ve got this 2009 
window kit still in our architecture. Or in our settlement system, we’ve got a system from 
1989 in 2018. What the hell are we going to do about it?” So, I do two versions in kind of 
my overall job as kind of leader of it all, I actually kind of care for what level of detail I 
managed it. But I bet it did two things. Of all new implementations and additions, I always 
won a reduction in overall number of components in our architecture every year, and I 
wondering, if you call it finance services, on a shortened duration of the portfolio, as well. 
So, we’re always looking at what’s the very oldest things we’ve got, and we’re sweeping those 
up with plans to renew them or get them off. And then I’m hoping that, you know that sets 
it up for the future where if we miss on a big theme, or if we woke up one morning, it’s like 
“Hey Goldman Sachs have done this!” If we’ve got fairly new architecture, or fairly modern 
technology, and fewer moving parts then we can move and adjust a lot quicker than if we 
had like 5,000 moving parts and architecture that goes back to 1969. [This comment 
reinforces the need for managing infrastructure debt. This is the only participant that seemed 
to be informed about the overall aging of his technology stacks. This comment also provides 
 101 
 
insight into what type of questions should be included to ensure infrastructure debt is well 
understood when a new IT investment is proposed.] 
Questions  
xv. Does every technology asset involved in the investment have an upgrade or training (for 
human capital) plan? 
xvi. Are upgrade and training costs provided specifically in future period non-discretionary 
budgets at the asset owner and team level? 
xvii. Has each technology asset not currently in the most recent release have a cost estimated 
and documented to get current? 
xviii. Have the impacts of non-current technology assets been evaluated and documented? 
xix. Was a list of backlogged upgrade projects for all technology assets readily available to the 
preparers of this business case? If so, who maintains and supplies it? 
xx. Has the support profile for every technology asset impacted by the investment been 
documented? (This support profile requires assessing the level of competency, skill, and 
domain knowledge required to support the current assets, in addition to the capacity of 
the competency, skill, and domain knowledge within the organization—FTEs vs. 
Consultants—and the depth of the bench for each asset. 
Architecture Debt 
Definition  
Refers to problems encountered in product architecture, for example, a violation of modularity, 
which can affect architectural requirements (performance, robustness, etc.). Normally this type of 
debt cannot be paid off with simple interventions in the code, implying more extensive development 
activities (Brown et al., 2010; Kruchten et al., 2012). 
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Exemplar Quotes 
Our networks are too complex. [This comment implies that the network would have been 
architected differently had the executive designed it. It also implies that at some point 
enterprise architecture was not a primary driver for IT investment or the network would not 
have wound up being “too” complex.] 
And there’s like an inverse cascade approval process, so the guy two down could be 
approved by his business partner. His boss and the business equivalent then approve, and 
then it comes to me and I approve. I present it to the president and he approves, and then it 
goes to the CEO and the CFO and they approve. And at each level, I guess the details 
becomes less, and the abstraction becomes greater. So, once you get to the CEO level, we’re 
probably looking at things more like the investment categories that I answered in question 
one. [If IT investment transpires as described by this executive—unless there is some 
enterprise architectural function that wasn’t mentioned—it is easy to see how systems end 
up too complex and not engineered to efficiently function. Senior executives may become 
‘rubber stampers’ of IT investment.] 
So, I primarily do, at the very highest level we chase two targets every year, fewer number of 
applications in the architecture, and younger technology in the architecture. [This comment 
is important, as it provides guidance on the type of data required to ensure architecture debt 
is assessed.] 
You know, I do think we have that, and part of my job is that last bit you touched on which 
is that conversation about “Listen, I know you want to do all these things. I know we’re in 
competition with J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley, but we really do have to get rid of this 
piece of hardware or upgrade this system that’s no longer supported by the software 
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vendor.” And I think that’s the part of a, you know, really you have to have a technology 
group and a technology management area that have backbone, because I’ve seen it in 
organizations where basically people get bullied by the business into doing whatever the 
business wants to do. And like you say, you wake up one morning in five years’ time 
realizing that there are a lot of things that should have been done along the way, and now 
you’ve got a massive legacy problem. [This comment highlights how architecture debt arises 
and provides insight into what type of information should be collected and provided so an 
organization doesn’t wake up one morning and discover a massive legacy problem.] 
Questions  
xxi. Is there a single “product owner” type resource accountable for the enterprise network? 
If so, did this person author and/or sign-off on the design, risks, estimates, etc. related 
to this investment’s impact on the current network? 
xxii. Has this investment been evaluated against all other material investments that have been 
approved? If so, how was the evaluation performed? Who signed off on the impact 
evaluation? 
xxiii. Is it understood if this investment will reduce the overall age of the enterprise’s 
architecture? Provide support for the answer. 
xxiv. Has the business case, including all supporting information related to design, impact, etc. 
been reviewed by an independent third party with expertise in this type of investment? 
Explain the third party’s relationship to the firm and supply the results of the evaluation. 
(Note: this evaluation may rely upon internal expertise, e.g., in the case where one 
business unit has implemented a similar investment or has expertise on their team that 
have implemented a similar investment at another firm). The key to adequately satisfying 
this requirement is that, in addition to having the required technical and domain 
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experience/knowledge, the third party is unbiased and removed from professional 
influence and the potential for pressure from investment sponsors. 
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Appendix J: Final Instrument
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